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1 Introduction
The present thesis analyzes how expert and market characteristics influence an ex-
pert’s incentive to defraud his customer in a market for credence goods. A credence
good is a good for which the customer does not know which quality of the good
she needs (Darby and Karni, 1973). Experts are able to identify the quality the
customer needs. This information asymmetry between the expert and the customer
may give rise to fraudulent behavior.
The analysis of experts’ fraud incentives in credence goods markets is highly
relevant. Firstly, there are numerous markets in which the good traded has the
credence characteristic: medical treatments, where the physician is better informed
about the patient’s disease than the patient himself (e. g., Gruber and Owings, 1996;
Iizuka, 2007); car repairs, where the mechanic knows better than the owner which
parts of the car have to be replaced (e. g., Hubbard, 1998; Taylor, 1995; Wolinsky,
1993); taxi rides, where the cab driver has more information on the shortest route
to the destination than the customer (Balafoutas et al., 2013); and lawyers’ advice,
where the lawyer is better informed about the winning prospects of taking a matter
to court than the potential claimant (Dulleck et al., 2012). Secondly, the markets
under consideration and the observed levels of fraud are large: the market for medical
products and services alone makes up about 10% of the GDP in most industrialized
countries (OECD, 2011). In the US, about 2.4 trillion USD are spent on health
care each year (OECD, 2011), up to 10% of which are estimated to be due to fraud
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007). Finally, credence goods markets do not
only make up a relevant share of the GDP today but constantly gain importance
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in a world of increasingly specialized products and services. Customers are less and
less able to evaluate the quality they actually need.
There are three different ways in which the expert may exploit his informational
advantage: He may provide high quality (at a possibly higher mark-up) although
low quality would have been sufficient, i. e., the expert overtreats (see, e. g., Alger
and Salanié, 2006; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006, 2007, 2009; Dulleck et al., 2009;
Emons, 1997, 2001; Hilger, 2011; Richardson, 1999). If the customer cannot observe
the quality provided, the expert may charge for the high quality good although he
only provides the low quality good, i. e., the expert overcharges (see, e. g., Dulleck
and Kerschbamer, 2006; Dulleck et al., 2009; Fong, 2005; Pesendorfer and Wolin-
sky, 2003; Sülzle and Wambach, 2005; Taylor, 1995; Wolinsky, 1993, 1995). If the
customer needs high quality but the expert only serves low quality, the expert un-
dertreats (see, e. g., Alger and Salanié, 2006; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006, 2007;
Hilger, 2011; Richardson, 1999). The customer does not notice whether she was
overcharged or overtreated even ex-post in a credence goods market, but the cus-
tomer is able to verify whether she was undertreated. In this thesis, I focus on the
expert’s incentive to overcharge. The fourth chapter additionally investigates the
expert’s incentive to undertreat.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter entitled
What Drives Fraud in a Credence Goods Market – Evidence From a Field Study is
based on joint work with Alexander Rasch.1 The work is motivated by the fact
that the existing literature on field studies in credence goods markets has mainly
focused on customer characteristics (e. g., Balafoutas et al., 2013). We contribute to
the literature by extending the analysis firstly to market characteristics, such as the
1I presented the results from this study at the 10th International Organization Conference (Wash-
ington D.C., United States, 2012), at the Economics Seminar (University of Augsburg, Ger-
many, 2012), at the European Economic Association (Malaga, Spain, 2012), at the European
Association for Research in Industrial Economics (Rome, Italy, 2012), at the European Science
Association (Cologne, Germany, 2012) and at the Applied Microeconomics Seminar (University
of Cologne, Germany, 2012).
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degree of competition, and secondly to expert characteristics.2 On the expert side,
we analyze the impact of the expert’s financial situation, competence, and reputa-
tional concerns on the expert’s incentive to overcharge. We resort to the unifying
model of Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) and extend it in order to make predictions
about the influence of these characteristics. We make use of a unique dataset on
car repair shops provided by Germany’s largest automobile club to test our theo-
retical predictions. The automobile club provides information on overcharging and
the firms’ competence. We extend this dataset by collecting the number of garages
in a ten-kilometer radius from a garage’s location in order to quantify the intensity
of competition. Furthermore, we determine a garage’s geographical proximity to
the next interstate and use it as an indicator for a lower share of repeated busi-
ness contacts and hence less reputational concerns. Last, we collect data about the
firm’s financial situation from the Electronic Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger). We
restrict our dataset to corporate garages. The restriction is feasible because only
corporate garages have to publish their financial situation. Furthermore, we derive
our predictions from a model assuming limited liability. Corporate garages mostly
operate under limited liability while non-corporate garages do not. We show that a
higher degree of competition lowers the incentive to overcharge. We find that firms
facing a critical financial situation are more likely to overcharge. Garages with a
high competence are less likely to overcharge than those with a low competence.
Our results also indicate that less reputation-oriented car repair shops defraud their
customers more often than those with high reputational concerns. These results are
in line with our theoretical predictions.
The third chapter entitled Fraud and Other-Regarding Preferences in a Market
for Credence Goods theoretically analyzes the impact of customers’ and experts’
other-regarding preferences on the expert’s incentive to overcharge.3 Previous work
2To the best of my knowledge, the only field study concerned with expert characteristics is
Schneider (2012). He analyzes the impact of reputational concerns on the expert’s incentive to
defraud.
3I presented the results from this study at the 8th World Congress on Health Economics (Toronto,
Canada, 2011), at the 10th Annual International Conference on Health Economics (Athens,
Greece, 2011), at the Spring Meeting for Young Economists (Groningen, Netherlands, 2011), at
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on experts’ behavior has mainly focused on monetary incentives (e. g., Dulleck and
Kerschbamer, 2006; Emons, 1997, 2001; Wolinsky, 1993, 1995). However, experi-
mental results show that experts like physicians base their decisions to a “consid-
erable extent” on norms like honesty (Dulleck et al., 2011). Even in a situation
where theory would predict that experts always defraud their customers, only half
of them actually do so. We therefore contribute to the literature by analyzing how
an expert’s preference for honesty and a customer’s preference for trust influence
the expert’s incentive to overcharge. Physicians face conscience costs in our model
when they overcharge their patients. Patients face trust costs when being charged
a major treatment because they anticipate that they may have been defrauded. We
study the impact of these preferences on the level of overcharging when patients can
consult a second physician. Contrary to intuition, we show that the level of fraud
does not necessarily decrease in equilibrium but may even rise compared to players
without other-regarding preferences. Welfare increases with experts’ honesty but
reacts ambiguously to increased patients’ trust costs.
The fourth chapter entitled Reputation in Credence Goods Markets—Experimental
Evidence is joint work with Wanda Mimra and Alexander Rasch.4 Previous experi-
mental work has studied credence goods markets where customers build up a private
history with respect to the sufficiency of a treatment and the prices charged (see
Dulleck et al., 2011). This work firstly extends the existing literature by analyzing
the impact of public histories on the experts’ incentive to defraud his customer.
In contrast to private histories, public histories imply that customers do not only
know their own history but customers observe all customers’ histories. The analysis
of public histories is motivated by the recent emergence of feedback platforms. A
prime example is the Arztnavigator 5 where patients pass on their experience with
specific physicians, aiming to help other patients compare the quality and the price
the 3rd Annual Conference of the German Society for Health Economics (Bayreuth, Germany,
2011), and at the Applied Microeconomics Seminar (University of Cologne, Germany, 2012).
4I presented this work at the Doctoral Seminar (University of Innsbruck, Austria, 2012).
5The Arztnavigator polls the patients with a standardized questionnaire about their last physician
visit. The results are cumulated per physician and publicly released (source: http://www.
arztnavigator.de).
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of physician services. The feedback platform thereby gives physicians the opportu-
nity to build up a reputation publicly.6 The second contribution in this chapter is to
analyze how the pricing regime impacts an expert’s incentive to defraud his customer
if experts can build up reputation. Whereas in the market for medical treatments,
legal services, and taxi rides, prices are regulated in most European countries, ex-
perts set individual prices in the car repair business. We experimentally investigate
how the possibility to build up reputation and how the pricing regime influence an
expert’s incentive to undertreat and to overcharge his customer. We make use of
a 2 × 2 factorial design and vary the reputation mechanism between private and
public histories and the price system between flexible and fixed prices. The results
show that the level of undertreatment and the level of overcharging are significantly
lower under fixed than under flexible prices. In contrast to intuition, the results
provide weak evidence that the level of overcharging is higher under public than
under private histories if prices are flexible while the opposite holds when prices are
fixed. We find the same pattern for the level of undertreatment but differences are
not significant.
The last chapter concludes. It discusses the implications of the studies presented
and gives an outlook for future avenues of research.
6Note that the patient can ex-post verify whether she is undertreated (or inappropriately treated)
because her disease is not cured. This is in contrast to overtreatment where the patient does
not take notice of the fraudulent behavior because she is healed.
2 What Drives Fraud in a Credence
Goods Market—Evidence From a
Field Study
This paper investigates the impact of four key economic variables on an expert firm’s
incentive to defraud its customers in a credence goods market: the level of competi-
tion, the expert firm’s financial situation, its competence, and its reputational con-
cerns. We use and complement the dataset of a nationwide field study conducted by
the German Automobile Association that regularly checks the reliability of garages
in Germany. We focus on corporate garages and find that more intense competi-
tion and high competence lower firms’ incentive to overcharge. A low concern for
reputation and a critical financial situation increase the incentive to overcharge.
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the impact of expert and market characteristics on an
expert firm’s incentive to defraud its customers in a credence goods market. We
make use of a field study in the German car repair market in order to identify the
drivers of fraudulent behavior. Faulty repairs and fraudulent behavior are major
issues in this market. According to a joint survey by the Consumer Federation
of America, the National Association of Consumer Agency Administrators, and the
North American Consumer Protection Investigators, faulty repairs in the auto repair
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market rank first among the top ten consumer complaints in 2010. The California
Department of Consumer Affairs notes that complaints related to car repairs also
grew fastest during the same period. Its Bureau of Auto Repair even shut down some
shops of one chain due to overcharging and overtreatment (Consumer Federation
of America et al., 2011). These results are in line with earlier studies which also
found that fraud related to auto repairs was among the most often observed types of
fraudulent behavior.7 In this paper, we focus on the expert’s incentive to overcharge.
Given the role fraud (and overcharging in particular) plays in this market, it is
important to better understand the factors that make it easier or harder for experts
to exploit their informational advantage at the expense of their customers. In or-
der to analyze experts’ overcharging behavior, we make use of the results from a
field study in the German car repair market that is carried out on a yearly basis by
the German Automobile Association (Allgemeiner Deutscher Automobil-Club e. V.,
ADAC), Europe’s largest automobile club. The ADAC has looked into the reliability
of German car repair shops over several years. We are interested in the influence of
four key economic variables on expert firms’ incentives to defraud their customers:
competition, financial status, firm competence, and reputation. By analyzing the
impact of these economic variables, our study complements other contributions that
have focused on different determinants of fraudulent behavior (see below). In con-
trast to earlier contributions, we focus on expert rather than customer character-
istics. Furthermore, by considering the degree of competition, we account for an
important market characteristic.
The automobile club’s database contains information on overcharging and the
firms’ competence. The automobile club recorded overcharging if the number of
repairs charged exceeded the number of faults fixed. We extend this database by
collecting the number of garages in a ten-kilometer distance from a garage’s location
7See, e.g., Titus et al. (1995). See also the study by the U.S. Department of Transportation cited
in Wolinsky (1993, 1995). A 2002 poll conducted by COMsciences, Inc. for Allstate Insurance
Company revealed that there was a general atmosphere of distrust in auto body repair shops
among consumers in California: among others, consumers were concerned about cheating and
inflated prices (see Business Wire, August 12, 2002, Monday: “Survey shows Californians fed up
with auto repair fraud; pending legislation threatens to block reform and restrict competition”).
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in order to quantify the intensity of competition. Furthermore, we determine a
garage’s geographical proximity to the next interstate and use it as an indicator for
a lower share of repeated business contacts and hence less reputational concerns.
Last, we collect data about the firm’s financial situation. In our main analysis, we
focus on corporate garages because only corporate garages have to publish their
financial situation. Furthermore, we derive our predictions from a model assuming
limited liability. Corporate garages mostly operate under limited liability while
non-corporate garages do not.
We show that a higher degree of competition lowers the incentive to overcharge.
We find that firms facing a critical financial situation are more likely to overcharge.
Garages with a high competence are less likely to overcharge than those with a low
competence. Our results also indicate that less reputation-oriented car repair shops
defraud their customers more often than those with high reputational concerns.
These results are in line with our theoretical predictions.
The seminal theoretical contribution on fraud in the car repair market is Taylor
(1995): he studies an expert’s incentive to overcharge his customer. The author
shows that under short-term contracts, experts will charge all customers for a treat-
ment independent of whether the car is faulty or not. Consequently, all customers
whose car is not faulty are overcharged. In contrast to that model, we assume that
customers are not committed to a certain expert, i.e., customers can search for a
second opinion after receiving the diagnosis. The reason we make use of a model
that captures second opinions is based on the way a car repair market functions. We
often observe that mechanics first suggest a treatment and then ask for customers’
approval before performing the treatment.
There exist only few experimental/empirical studies focusing on the determinants
of dishonest behavior in markets for credence goods. Balafoutas et al. (2013) perform
a field experiment on credence goods concerning taxi rides in Athens, Greece. The
authors focus on the impact of customer characteristics on the expert’s incentive
to cheat. Their study reveals that if passengers have only poor information about
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optimal routes, they are taken on longer detours. The authors also point out that a
higher (perceived) customer income increases the level of fraud.8
A related study to ours is the recent work by Schneider (2012): similar to our
paper, he is interested in garages’ (dis)honest behavior toward customers. Schneider
(2012) analyzes data from a field experiment where he visited garages undercover
in order to check whether expert reputation may alleviate the efficiency problems
arising from asymmetric information. He finds both pervasive overtreatment and
undertreatment but no evidence that reputation helps reduce these problems.9
In the present study, we are the first to explore the influence of market character-
istics on the level of overcharging in the field. More precisely, we analyze the impact
of competition on expert firms’ incentive to defraud their customers. In the com-
petition policy debate, the level of competition among car repair shops often comes
up as an important issue: for example, in the above-mentioned poll performed by
COMsciences, a great majority of participants supported increased competition in
auto repair (e.g., through insurance-owned shops) in order to reduce widespread
fraud. Interestingly, the aspect of competition in credence goods markets has only
been studied from a theoretical perspective or in the laboratory. Furthermore, we
investigate the effect of essential expert characteristics which are not accounted for
in Schneider (2012). The experts’ financial situation as well as their competence
plays a crucial role in the experts’ decision on whether to overcharge the customer.
Again, the 2002 COMsciences poll revealed that an “overwhelming majority (74%)
[of consumers] fear they are often cheated by auto body repair shops that do poor
quality work.” Moreover, we provide theoretical predictions on these effects from
an extension of the unifying model in Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006). Our study
8Dulleck et al. (2011) provide the first experimental study on credence goods. Their main focus is
on the role of liability and verifiability in credence goods markets and consider reputation as an
extension. They show that neither competition nor reputation decreases the experts’ incentive
to overcharge. In their empirical study on restaurant hygiene, Jin and Leslie (2009) find that
chain-affiliated restaurants have a better hygiene than independent restaurants. This is due to
the reputational effects caused by the affiliation.
9He also shows that there is a positive relationship between the level of capacity available at a
garage at the time of the visit and the probability of a repair recommendation. Moreover, there
is a repeat-business effect for the diagnosis fee.
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is also based on a larger dataset than Schneider (2012) which allows us to draw
more comprehensive conclusions on the underlying causes for fraudulent behavior.
Moreover, whereas Schneider (2012) pools data from two different studies, we can
revert to data from a single study.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we derive
our hypotheses from the theoretical literature on credence goods. We describe the
dataset in section 2.3. In section 2.4, we present our results and compare them to the
theoretical predictions. We check the robustness of our results in section 2.5. The
last section concludes and discusses implications for other credence goods markets.
2.2 Theoretical Predictions
For the theoretical analysis, we make use of the model by Dulleck and Kerschbamer
(2006) to derive our hypotheses. We present the basic underlying incentives which
help explain firms’ incentive to overcharge.10
Consider the following car repair market. There is a mass one of homogeneous
customers (car owners) who all either face a major or a minor problem which occurs
with an ex-ante probability of h and 1− h, respectively. The problem can be fixed
through a major or minor treatment11, respectively. Customers do not know which
type of treatment they require. On the other hand, there is a number of liable expert
firms (garages) n (with n ≥ 2) which are able to diagnose the treatment needed.
Liability implies that experts cannot provide a minor treatment to customers fac-
ing a major problem, i.e., experts cannot undertreat their customers. Experts set
treatment prices and incur costs for providing a treatment. The minor treatment
induces costs cL that are lower than for the major treatment cH . Experts set a price
10An extensive review of the theoretical literature and a unifying model are given in Dulleck and
Kerschbamer (2006).
11We apply the notion of minor and major treatment used in the credence goods literature. In
the real-life market we analyze, the minor treatment corresponds to performing no treatment
while the major treatment corresponds to performing a treatment.
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pL for the minor treatment and a price pH for the major treatment.12 Assuming
that the customer cannot verify the type of treatment, experts have an incentive
to overcharge customers with a minor problem by providing a minor treatment but
charging for a major treatment. Customers get utility v if their problem is fixed
and zero otherwise. They incur search costs of d (due to time and effort) per expert
consulted independently of whether they accept the expert’s recommendation. We
assume that these costs are not too high (d < (cH − cL)(1 − h)), i.e., economies
of scope are sufficiently low. This appears to be a reasonable assumption for in-
spections in the car repair market which follow a well-established routine. We also
assume that it is always (i.e., even ex post) efficient that any customer with a prob-
lem is treated which means that v−cH−d > 0 holds.13 Note that—compatible with
the car repair market—we consider the case where a customer is not committed to
undergo the treatment recommended by the expert but may decide to spend addi-
tional per-visit search costs d on a second, third, etc. opinion instead. Moreover,
customers are able to verify whether their problem has been fixed or not.
In this setup, there exists an equilibrium which is characterized as follows:14 ex-
pert firms set prices such that they make a positive profit on minor treatments
whereas marginal-cost pricing occurs for the major treatment. Experts always rec-
ommend the major treatment if needed but also recommend the major treatment
with strictly positive probability x if the customer only needs the minor treatment,
i.e., overcharging occurs with strictly positive probability.15 On the other hand,
customers always accept a minor recommendation but visit a second expert with
positive probability 1 − y if they are recommended the major treatment. On their
12We assume that there is a lower bound equal to marginal costs cH and an upper bound equal
to cH + d for the price of the major treatment. The assumptions map to the car repair market
because most car producers enjoin garages on a price range for inspections.
13We further assume that customers who are indifferent between visiting an expert and not visiting
an expert opt for a visit. Customers who decide for a visit and are indifferent between two or
more experts randomize (with equal probability) among them.
14See part (i) of Lemma 6 in Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006).
15See also Pitchik and Schotter (1987, 1993), Wolinsky (1995), Fong (2005), as well as Sülzle and
Wambach (2005) for outcomes with overcharging.
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second visit, they accept any recommendation with certainty. Moreover, a customer
is never undertreated due to the experts’ liability.
In such a market, two incentive-compatibility constraints play an important role:
an expert firm consulted by a customer with a minor problem finds it more (less)
profitable to cheat rather than treat its customers honestly if and only if
pL − cL < (>)y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y) (pH − cL) (2.1)
The left-hand side gives the profit from honest treatment. Accordingly, the right-
hand side represents the gains from recommending the major treatment. Note that
in this case, the fraction 1/(1 + x(1− y)) of customers are on their first visit and
accept the high recommendation with probability y. x(1− y)/(1 + x(1− y)) cus-
tomers are on their second visit and accept a high recommendation with certainty.
Similarly, a customer prefers (does not prefer) to seek a second opinion if and only
if
d < (>)
x(1− h)
h+ x(1− h)(1− x)(pH − pL) (2.2)
d represents the additional costs of searching for a second opinion whereas the right-
hand side of the inequality gives the expected savings from visiting a second expert
firm. Note that with probability x(1− h)/(h+ x(1− h)), the customer suffers from
a minor problem given a major recommendation at the first visit. With probability
1−x, the second expert honestly recommends the minor treatment. In this case, the
customer saves the cost differential pH − pL compared to the first recommendation.
Taking this market as a starting point, we use the two inequalities given in (2.1)
and (2.2) to motivate our hypotheses. We first look at the relation between compe-
tition and overcharging:
Hypothesis 2.1. As the degree of competition among expert firms intensifies, firms
tend to overcharge less.
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We extend the above model by assuming that the customers’ search costs d depend
on the number of firms n that are located in a customer’s neighborhood. The more
garages there are in a customer’s neighborhood, the lower are the search costs, i.e.,
d′(n) < 0. This is due to the fact that customers have to spend less time and
effort searching for suitable experts. Formally, customers’ optimal search decision is
determined by
d(n) < (>)
x(1− h)
h+ x(1− h)(1− x)(pH − pL) (2.3)
Ceteris paribus, customers look out for a second opinion at a lower cost as the
left-hand side decreases in the number of firms. Consequently, they are more likely
to reject a major treatment recommendation. This in turn decreases the firms’
incentive to overcharge (see Lemma 2.1 in Appendix A).
Next, we have a closer look at the impact of a lower financial status on overcharg-
ing:
Hypothesis 2.2. An expert firm in a critical financial situation is more likely to
overcharge its customers.
Suppose a firm in the above-described market additionally has to bear fixed costs
f in order to run its business and firms differ in their financial assets (low and high).
Now, if a firm lacks sufficient financial resources to survive the current period if it
does not attract any customer, it does not pay the fixed costs in case it goes bankrupt
due to limited liability.16 As a consequence, it faces lower costs and hence higher
profits whenever it recommends the major treatment compared to the firm with the
sound financial background. As a result, this firm’s optimal recommendation choice
then depends on
pL − cL − f < (>)y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y) (pH − cL − f) .
16Note that the assumption of limited liability is satisfied for most of the firms in our dataset.
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This means that, all things equal, whenever the financially weak expert firm does
not find it profitable to cheat, this is even less the case for the financially strong
firm. Hence, the latter has a lower incentive to defraud its customers because it gains
more by recommending the minor treatment whenever it is needed (see Lemma 2.2
in Appendix A).
Next, we look at the influence of a firm’s competence on its incentive to defraud
its customers:
Hypothesis 2.3. A high-competence expert firm is less likely to overcharge than a
low-competence firm.
Suppose a high-competence firm in our market has lower treatment costs than
a low-competence firm. This is captured by a reduction of γ of the initial costs
for each treatment which may be due to, e.g., less time-consuming fault detection.
Compared to a low competence firm, a firm with high competence only benefits
from its better cost situation with certainty if it recommends the minor treatment.
If it recommends the major treatment, it may realize the cost advantage only with
a probability strictly smaller than one. More precisely, all things equal, the optimal
recommendation decision depends on
pL − (cL − γ) < (>)y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y) (pH − (cL − γ)) .
As a consequence, the high competence firm faces relatively higher costs and lower
profits whenever it recommends the major treatment. Similarly to the above argu-
ment in the context of fixed costs, this means that whenever it is not optimal for the
low-competence expert firm to cheat, cheating is an even less profitable option for
the high-competence firm. As a result, the former has a greater incentive to defraud
its customers (see Lemma 2.3 in Appendix A).
Last, let us have a closer look at the relation between reputation and overcharging:
Hypothesis 2.4. Experts with low reputational concerns are more likely to over-
charge than experts with high reputational concerns.
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Experts with high reputational concerns face many repeated interactions. Dulleck
et al. (2011) show that repeated interaction decreases the incentive to overcharge as
experts find it optimal to forgo short-term profits from overcharging because they
benefit more from higher profits due to reputation in the future. In line with these
findings, Wolinsky (1993) and Park (2005) find that the need to maintain a good
reputation decreases the incentive to defraud.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Sample
We make use of pooled cross-section data from the ADAC’s garage tests in the
years 2006 and 2008–2010; in 2007, there was no test.17 The automobile club’s
dataset provides information on 336 garages. We disregard 39 garages that belong
to the same corporate entity because these observations are not independent. 297
observations remain. In our main analysis, we further restrict the sample to 134
corporate enterprises because of data availability and firm characteristics: firstly,
only corporate enterprises have to publish data on their financial situation. As
we shall see later, a garage’s financial situation is an important predictor for the
garage’s incentive to overcharge. Thus, not considering the financial situation would
lead to an omitted variable bias in the estimates. Secondly, the group of corporate
garages is a homogeneous subset of all garages while non-corporate garages differ to
a greater extent in their properties. The data shows that the variance in competition
intensity, competence, and reputational concerns is larger for non-corporate than for
corporate garages. Thirdly, we derived our theoretical predictions based on a model
that assumes firms to operate under limited liability. This is the case for almost
all corporate but not for non-corporate garages. Hence, restricting the dataset to
the corporate enterprises seems reasonable. We discuss the case of the unrestricted
sample with the 297 independent garages in our robustness section.
17See http://www.adac.de/infotestrat/tests/autohaus-werkstatt/ for details.
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(a) Garage locations across Germany (source:
Google Maps).
(b) Population density across Germany (source:
Federal Institute for Research on Building, Ur-
ban Affairs and Spatial Development).
Figure 2.1: Location of garages and population density in Germany.
The location of the 134 corporate garages closely follows the population density
within Germany. Figures 2.1(a) and 2.1(b) illustrate this relationship.
The timing of the data collection is as follows:
1. Club members from all over Germany are asked whether they would like to
participate in the garage test.
2. The automobile club checks whether the cars fit the test criteria. The cars have
to be similar with respect to maintenance-related characteristics (concerning
effort and time required): all cars had to be registered during the same time
period for the first time, have a gasoline engine (of the most popular perfor-
mance type), have to be due for the main inspection, and the owners need to
present a detailed record of previous inspections.
3. Motor vehicle experts prepare the cars with the same five faults. The faults
are the following: the license plate lamp does not work; the air pressure in the
spare wheel is too low; the exhaust is loose; the coolant level is low; and the
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front-right light is displaced to the very bottom. If any of these faults cannot
be implemented, the screen wiper blade on the passenger side is cut down to
two centimeters. These potential faults are all listed in any of the car makers’
inspection guidelines which means that they should be easily detected.
4. The automobile club sends these cars off to garages located in the vicinity of
the car owner’s residence. There is a maximum of one vehicle test per garage.
5. Upon completion of the inspections, the automobile club assesses each garage’s
performance according to a detailed evaluation scheme that also includes is-
sues related to service etc. The results are published in the club’s monthly
magazine (ADAC Motorwelt) and can be readily accessed online. The auto-
mobile club gives detailed reports on each garage by exactly listing how many
faults were found and fixed and whether only those repairs actually performed
were charged.
Our binary dependent variable overcharging indicates whether a garage charged
for a repair it did not perform. Note that our data only covers parts of the garages’
overcharging behavior as we can only determine whether or not a garage charges
more repairs than performed. We cannot account for more expensive repairs charged
than performed. We consider the number of faults detected by the garage from the
automobile club’s dataset as an indicator for a garage’s competence.
This very basic dataset does not allow us to investigate the impact of the other
three key economic variables we are interested in: competition, the firm’s financial
situation, and its reputational concerns. In order to analyze their influence, we
need to complement the automobile club’s dataset. This is done in three steps: we
(i) introduce a measure for the competitive environment each of the garages does
business in, (ii) check for the garages’ financial indicators, and (iii) suggest a proxy
for reputational concerns (see Appendix B for screenshots of the data collection).
Table 2.1 provides an overview over the variables, the proxies, and the respective
data sources.
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Table 2.1: Overview on variables.
Variable Proxy Source
Overcharging Treatments charged but not
performed
ADAC experiment, 2006
& 2008–2010
Competition intensity # of competitors within
10km is above median
Gelbe Seiten from 2011
Financial situation Negative equity Elektronischer Bun-
desanzeiger, 2006 &
2008–2010
Competence # of faults found out of 5 ADAC experiment, 2006
& 2008–2010
Low reputation Distance to next interstate
less than 1500m
Google Maps Distance
Calculator, 2010
Ad (i): in order to evaluate the strength of the competition a garage faces, we
analyze the number of competitors in a garage’s neighborhood. We chose the number
of competitors as an indicator for competition over other measures such as the
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (Hirschman, 1964) and the price-cost margin (Boone,
2008) because of data availability. Note that the number of competitors has been
used as a proxy for competition by other studies in credence goods markets before
(see, e. g., Pike, 2010) but it has not been tested how well the number of competitors
actually proxies the competition intensity. Thus, the validity of the proxy we use
remains to be shown.
We collect the number of garages that are within a distance of ten kilometers
from the garage that is characterized. We consider ten kilometers to be the average
distance a potential customer is willing to travel to a competitor.18 We obtain the
data on the number of competitors of every single garage through a request to the
publicly available directory of businesses sorted by branches, the German version
of yellow pages (Gelbe Seiten). Gelbe Seiten provides one of the largest phone and
18Our results do not change if we take five or 20 kilometers as the radius a customer is willing to
travel (see section 2.5 for robustness checks).
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address lists of companies in Germany.19 The great advantage of this database
compared to, e. g., Google Places, is that the editing process ensures that businesses
listed actually exist and fall into the category of car repair shops. We perform a
search for “Autowerkstätten” (“car repair shops”) within a radius of ten kilometers
from the garage’s address and count the number of results. Last, we divide the
group of garages into those being above the median number of competitors and
those below. By dichotomizing competition intensity, we account for the fact that
garages’ overcharging behavior most likely depends upon whether there are few or
many competitors but not on whether there are one or two additional competitors
in the nearer neighborhood. Note importantly that our results do not rely on the
dichotomization of the variable as shown in the robustness section.
Ad (ii): we extend the automobile club’s dataset by adding the garages’ financial
situation at the beginning and the end of the test year. The financial data is pub-
licly available through the Electronic Federal Gazette for corporate enterprises in
Germany (elektronischer Bundesanzeiger).20 According to German corporate law,
enterprises are required to publish basic financial information for possible sharehold-
ers. In case the balance information was not available by August 2011, we proxied
the financial data by using the data from the year before. We divide the garages into
those with positive equity and those with negative equity either at the beginning
or the end of the year. A firm faces negative equity if its debts exceed its assets.
These firms are in a critical financial situation because banks are no longer will-
ing to lend additional money. Firms with a negative equity are not yet bankrupt,
though. Bankruptcy is only reached if one of the debts is due and cannot be paid
back to the lender. As the amount of a firm’s equity is correlated with firm size, we
dichotomize the equity variable. Hence, we only capture the firm’s financial status
without confounding the status with firm size. We chose to use equity as a proxy for
a firm’s financial situation over other indicators such as profit because equity is not
subject to yearly up- and downturns. In particular, equity is invariant with respect
19See http://www.gelbeseiten.de for details.
20See http://www.bundesanzeiger.de for details.
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to depreciation. Again the drawback of the self-definition of our proxy is that the
validity of the proxy has not yet been investigated by other studies.
Ad (iii): we extend the database by adding the garages’ distance to the next
interstate. We consider this distance as a good proxy for a garage’s reputational
concerns. Cars that break down on the interstate are usually towed to the next
garage.21 This means that those garages that are located close to an interstate
face more one-time interactions. More one-time interactions imply a lower chance
of repeat business. As a consequence, they are less concerned when it comes to
building up a reputation compared to the garages that are located further away
from an interstate. We consider garages that are located less than 1500 meters away
from an interstate to be close and all others not to be close to an interstate.22 We
dichotomize the distance to the next interstate because cars are hardly ever towed
to a garage that is far away from the interstate. This holds irrespective of whether
the garage is ten or 30 kilometers away from the next interstate. We complement
the dataset by the garages’ exact distances to the next interstate which we calculate
using Google Maps Distance Calculator. The Google Maps Distance Calculator uses
Google’s geographic database via APIs and enables the user to select two arbitrary
points on the map in order to calculate the air-line distance. We take the garage’s
address as the reference point and the closest point on the next interstate as the
second point.23
There might be reverse-causality concerns for the relationship between reputa-
tional concerns and overcharging as well as the level of competition and overcharg-
ing. This is because the choice of a garage’s location and thus the distance to
the next interstate and the level of competition might not be exogenous to explain
overcharging. There are three reasons why we think that a garage’s location is in-
21The vast majority of the overall number of towings in Germany are conducted by the
ADAC. The ADAC always tows to the next garage as their free service for mem-
bers. Having one’s car towed to any other garage is subject to a service fee (see
http://www.adac.de/mitgliedschaft/leistungen/default.aspx).
22Our results are robust if we consider garages less than 1000 meters or less than 2000 meters
away from the next interstate as being close to the interstate (see section 2.5).
23See http://www.daftlogic.com/projects-google-maps-distance-calculator.htm for de-
tails.
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deed exogenous: firstly, the average age of the garages that overcharged in the test
amounts to 20 years (the minimum age to ten years). The garage’s overcharging
behavior today would have to be correlated to the choice of location twenty years
ago if endogeneity concerns were to hold. Hence, a reverse causality does not seem
very plausible. Secondly, garages cannot be located anywhere but have to be opened
up within a zoned area. Thus, garages are not free to choose a location but are re-
stricted in their choice of location. Thirdly, asking business insiders about where to
open new garages provides a clear message: maximizing customer visits is the main
goal.24 These three reasons strengthen our argument that the location is not chosen
with respect to the type of interaction (i. e., repeated or one-time) or the number of
competitors.
Reverse causality between the incentive to overcharge and a garage’s financial
situation might exist. As overcharging influences the firm’s financial situation, we
might encounter endogeneity when considering the equity at the end of the year.
Note, however, that overcharging increases equity compared to an honest repair.
Consequently, if there was reverse causality between overcharging and a firm’s eq-
uity, we underestimate the effect of the financial situation on the probability of
overcharging. Thus, reverse causality with respect to the financial situation would
weaken our results.
2.3.2 Descriptives
After restricting the dataset, the dataset contains 134 corporate garages of which
128 did not overcharge, i. e., we find that six (4.5%) of the garages overcharged their
customers (see Table 2.2). This number is in accordance with Schneider (2012) who
finds that in three out of 51 visits (or 6%) overcharging occurred.25 Although 4.5%
24See, e. g., Johnson, D.L.: “6 tips to start your auto repair shop business today” (see http:
//ezinearticles.com/?6-Tips-To-Start-Your-Auto-Repair-Shop-Business-Today&id=
1176780) or eHow: “How to open an auto repair shop” (see http://www.ehow.com/how_
2387498_open-auto-repair-shop.html).
25The average amount overcharged was $32 per incident in the study by Schneider (2012). The
sum of overchargings across all visits accounted for two percent of total charges.
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Table 2.2: Descriptives.
Variable Mean Standard deviation Min Max Obs.
Overcharging 0.045 0.208 0 1 134
(= 1 if true)
Intense competition 0.502 0.501 0 1 134
(= 1 if # of competitors
is above median)
Critical financial situation 0.134 0.342 0 1 134
(= 1 if true)
Competence 4.239 1.125 0 5 134
(# of faults found out of 5)
Low reputation 0.224 0.418 0 1 134
(= 1 if distance < 1500m)
overcharging cases might not seem to be a lot, the issue of overcharging turns out
to be an important problem. The yearly turnover in the market for car repairs
amounts to about 30 billion Euros in Germany alone (Zentralverband deutsches
Kraftfahrtzeuggewerbe (Ed.), 2012). Following our data, the value of transactions
where overcharging is involved would make up about 1.35 billion Euros per year
which is far from negligible.
Table 2.2 also provides the descriptives for the four explanatory variables. 13.4%
of the garages face a critical financial situation. About half of the garages face
by construction of the variable an intense competition. The high competence (4.24
faults found out of 5) is due to the fact that the faults are all listed on the mechanics’
checklists for inspections issued by all carmakers. Every fifth garage is close to the
interstate and therefore faces low reputational concerns.
In order to provide a detailed characterization of the six garages that overcharged,
Table 2.3 lists the values for all four variables for each of these garages.26 Note
that there is considerable variation in the three variables critical financial situation,
26Note that the automobile club requested us not to publish names and addresses of the garages
involved in the test. Therefore, garages are anonymous in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Characteristics of the garages that overcharge.
Garage Intense Critical financial Competence Low
competition situation reputation
Garage 1 0 0 4 0
Garage 2 0 0 1 1
Garage 3 0 1 4 1
Garage 4 0 0 2 1
Garage 5 0 1 4 0
Garage 6 1 1 3 0
competence, and low reputation. The variable competition intensity, however, is
almost separated. We will account for this quasi-separation in our data analysis by
using a special type of regression analysis.
The correlations given in Table 2.4 provide a first impression concerning the re-
lationship between the different variables. All four explanatory variables prove to
be correlated with the explained variable overcharging. Looking at the relation-
ship between the explanatory variables, we observe that an intense competition is
slightly correlated with low reputational concerns. Furthermore, a low competence is
weakly correlated with a critical financial situation. This may be due to the fact that
a garage with only a low competence attracts fewer customers than those garages
with a high competence. Note, though, that the correlations between the variables
amount to a maximum of 23.2% and are hence far from a collinear relationship.
Table 2.5 and Figure 2.2 illustrate that the two groups—garages that do and do
not overcharge—differ considerably in their characteristics: Figure 2.2(a) shows that
garages that overcharge face an intense competition less often than those garages
that do not overcharge. This difference in competition intensity is weakly significant
(Mann Whitney U Test, two-tailed: p = 0.096). 50% of the garages that overcharge
are in a critical financial situation whereas significantly fewer of those garages that
do not overcharge have a critical financial background (11.7%, Mann Whitney U
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Table 2.4: Correlations.
Variable Over- Intense Critical fin. Com- Low
charging competition situation petence reputation
Overcharging 1
Intense competition −0.144 1
Critical fin. sit. 0.232 0 1
Low reputation 0.104 0.232 −0.00507 1
Competence −0.239 −0.0266 −0.201 0.0875 1
Table 2.5: Mean comparisons between garages that did and did not overcharge.
Intense Critical financial Competence*** Low
competition* situation*** reputation
Overcharging = 1 0.167 0.500 3.000 0.500
Overcharging = 0 0.516 0.117 4.297 0.273
Mann Whitney U Test, two-tailed: ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
Test, two-tailed: p = 0.007; see also Figure 2.2(b)). The average competence of
garages that overcharge is significantly lower than the average competence of those
garages that do not overcharge (Mann Whitney U Test, two-tailed: p = 0.003; see
also Figure 2.2(c)). Figure 2.2(d) suggests that garages that overcharge have low
reputational concerns more often than garages that do not overcharge. However,
this difference is not statistically significant (Mann Whitney U Test, two-tailed:
p = 0.231).
2.4 Results
The small sample of our empirical analysis, the skewed distribution of our dependent
variable, and the quasi-separation of the data with respect to competition intensity
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(a) Distribution of intense competition by
overcharging.
(b) Distribution of critical financial situa-
tion by overcharging.
(c) Distribution of competence by over-
charging.
(d) Distribution of low reputational con-
cerns by overcharging.
Figure 2.2: Distribution of explanatory variables by overcharging.
represent a challenge concerning the deviation of meaningful conclusions. When
addressing these issues, we make use of a well-established method—namely the Firth
logit regression (Firth, 1993)—which is typically used in other research areas where
small samples, skewed distribution of the dependent variable, and a quasi-separation
are frequently observed phenomena. Most importantly, note that our results do not
depend on the choice of the regression model used as we will show in the robustness
checks (see section 2.5).
Let us shortly comment on the advantages of the Firth regression: the standard
maximum likelihood estimation used in binary regression models assumes the sam-
ple to be large. As the sample size converges to infinity, the parameter estimates
converge to the true parameter values. Hence, estimates may be biased in smaller
samples. The Firth regression uses a penalized likelihood estimation removing the
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first-order bias that occurs due to the small sample (Heinze, 2006). The Firth ap-
proach also regularizes the data and thereby circumvents the separation problem
(Zorn, 2005). Hence, the Firth regression always leads to finite parameter estimates
which is not the case when using regressions based on the standard maximum like-
lihood estimation. The approach is frequently used in medical research27 and has
proven to outperform alternative small sample models such as the exact logistic re-
gression (Heinze, 2006). Heinze (2006) highlights that for small samples “penalized
likelihood confidence intervals for parameters show excellent behavior in terms of
coverage probability and provide higher power than exact confidence intervals.”
Given the four explanatory variables—competition intensity, financial situation,
competence, and reputation—our Firth logit model is specified as follows:
firth_logit(overcharging) = β0 + β1intense_competition
+ β2critical_financial_situation
+ β3competence+ β4low_reputation+  (2.4)
We report the results of the Firth regression in Table 2.6. We also present the
results of the linear probability model in order to ease interpretation. To evaluate
the model fit, we calculate McFadden’s R2 for the binary response models and the
ordinary R2 for the linear model. We choose to use McFadden’s R2 as a measure
for the binary model fit as it can also be applied to the Firth logit regression.
McFadden’s R2 is defined as 1 − L1/L0 where L1 is the log-likelihood of the fully
specified model and L0 is the log-likelihood of the null model. Interpreting L0 as
the total sum of squares in linear regression analysis and L1 as the residual sum of
squares, McFadden’s R2 provides a similar measurement for the model fit compared
to the ordinary R2 (Wooldridge, 2009). McFadden (1979) suggests that models with
27As an example, George et al. (2010) apply the Firth logit regression to the question of how
a medication (phenylephrine) impacts spinal anesthesia-induced hypotension. Their work is
based on a sample size of 45 test persons. Only nine test persons did not show a positive
reaction to the medication.
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Table 2.6: What drives fraud?
Overcharging Firth Logit OLS
Intense competition −2.049∗∗ −0.078∗∗
(= 1 if # of competitors > median) (1.040) (0.035)
Critical financial situation 1.757∗∗ 0.114∗∗
(= 1 if true) (0.891) (0.051)
Competence −0.765∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗
(# of faults found out of 5) (0.315) (0.015)
Low reputational concerns 2.078∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(= 1 if distance < 1500m) (0.999) (0.039)
Constant −0.510 0.220∗∗∗
(1.125) (0.071)
McFadden R2 0.412 −
R2 − 0.142
Observations 134 134
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
an R2 between 0.2 and 0.4 exhibit an excellent fit. The McFadden R2 of our Firth
regression amounts to 0.412 and is hence close to an excellent fit.
Let us next turn to the results.
Result 2.1. Garages facing intense competition overcharge less often than those in
a weakly competitive environment.
In line with theory, we find that a high level of competition decreases the level of
overcharging. According to the OLS estimates, a (highly) competitive environment
decreases the probability of being overcharged by an expert by 7.8 percentage points.
In fact, five out of the six garages that overcharge face a competition level that is
lower than the median (see Table 2.3) whereas only every second garage that does not
overcharge faces a competition level that is lower than the median (see Table 2.5).28
28Note that clearly, the effect of competition crucially depends on whether experts’ and customers’
interests with respect to fraudulent behavior are aligned or not (see footnote 7). In their
empirical study, Bennett et al. (2013) find that competition among experts for vehicle emissions
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Result 2.2. A critical financial situation leads to a larger incentive to overcharge.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2.2, we find that a critical financial situation increases
a garage’s incentive to overcharge. The OLS model estimates that a critical financial
situation increases the probability of being overcharged by 11.4 percentage points.
Garages in a critical financial situation overcharge more often compared to those
with a solid financial background. In case overcharging is detected, the garage does
not bear the costs of defrauding because it will file bankruptcy. On the other hand, if
overcharging is not detected, the fraudulent behavior will help overcome the garages’
financial difficulties.
Result 2.3. A higher competence decreases the garages’ incentive to overcharge.
In line with Hypothesis 2.3, garages that exhibit high competence have a lower
incentive to defraud their customers. The OLS regression results indicate that the
probability of being overcharged decreases by 4.1 percentage points for each addi-
tional fault the garage detects.
Result 2.4. Low reputational concerns increase the incentive to overcharge.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2.4, the regression results show that low reputational
concerns increase a garage’s incentive to overcharge. The intuition is as follows:
garages that have a low reputational concern, face many one-time interactions.
Hence, they can overcharge their customers without hazarding a loss of future earn-
ings. As recommended in Consumer Federation of America et al. (2011, p. 20),
customers should “only do business with auto repair shops that you know and trust
or that have good reputations based on other people’s experiences. If you have any
doubts about the diagnosis of your car’s problem, bring it to another shop for a sec-
ond opinion if possible.” This statement is supported by our data. The OLS results
tests increases fraud. This is due to the fact that in their case, car owners whose cars are passed
at higher rates due to fiercer competition may benefit from fraud as they save money on costly
repairs. This, however, gives experts a greater incentive to generate a competitive advantage
through illicit actions which raises the question whether competition is necessarily the ideal
market structure in such an environment.
What Drives Fraud in a Credence Goods Market? 29
Table 2.7: Robustness against different models.
Overcharging OLS Logit Probit Scobit
Intense competition −0.078∗∗ −2.593∗∗ −1.253∗∗ −2.539∗∗
(= 1 if # of competitors > median) (0.035) (1.262) (0.605) (1.162)
Critical financial situation 0.114∗∗ 1.966∗ 0.884∗ 2.014∗∗
(= 1 if true) (0.051) (1.010) (0.535) (0.870)
Competence −0.041∗∗∗ −0.887∗∗ −0.454∗∗ −0.835∗∗∗
(# of faults found out of 5) (0.015) (0.367) (0.191) (0.316)
Low reputational concerns 0.077∗∗ 2.423∗∗ 1.190∗∗ 2.264∗∗
(= 1 if distance < 1500m) (0.039) (1.157) (0.559) (1.047)
Constant 0.220∗∗∗ −0.540 −0.282 −15.006
(0.071) (1.263) (0.717) (1878.318)
McFadden R2 − 0.352 0.345 0.365
R2 0.142 − − −
Observations 134 134 134 134
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
suggest that the probability of a garage overcharging its customer is increased by
7.7 percentage points if the garage has low reputational concerns.
2.5 Robustness Checks
Our results turn out to be extremely robust against alternative models such as
the logit model with a regular maximum likelihood estimator, the probit, and the
scobit regression (see Table 2.7). The latter accounts for the skewed distribution of
the overcharging variable but is not significantly different from the logit regression.
Significance levels of our explanatory variables remain practically unchanged when
using these alternative models. The only decrease in a significance level from 5% to
10% occurs for the variable critical financial situation in the logit and probit model.
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The results are also robust against choosing different parameters as cut-off points.
In the above analysis, we measured the number of competitors within ten kilometers
and then divided the garages in two categories: those facing less or more competitors
than the median level. As Table 2.8 shows, measuring the number of competitors
within five or 20 kilometers instead of ten kilometers does not change our results.
Note, however, that the significance level for the two variables competition intensity
and critical financial situation decreases from 5% to 10% when varying the radius.
Our results are also robust against including competition intensity as a continuous
variable instead of using the dichotomized variable (see also Table 2.8). Yet, the
significance level of competition intensity decreases from 5% to 10%. A possible
explanation here might be that once a garage faces intense competition, the entry
of further competitors does not influence the garage’s overcharging decision.
Looking at the variable of low reputational concerns, Table 2.8 shows that when
considering those garages within 1000 or 2000 meters instead of 1500 meters to the
next interstate as being close to the interstate, we do not obtain results any different
from the above analysis. The significance level of competition intensity decreases
from 5% to 10% when considering garages within 1000 meters. Similarly, the sig-
nificance level of reputational concerns decreases from 5% to 10% when considering
garages within 2000 meters to be close to the interstate.
Table 2.9 presents the results of our robustness checks with respect to alternative
specifications. We control for yearly effects in order to ensure that the financial crisis
does not affect garages’ behavior. The results remain unchanged but the significance
level of competition intensity and critical financial situation decreases from 5% to
10%. Furthermore, we show that whether a garage is an authorized or independent
garage does not change any of our results. The significance level of a critical financial
situation decreases from 5% to 10% when controlling for the years.
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Table 2.8: Robustness against different cut-off points.
Overcharging Firth logit Firth logit Firth logit Firth logit Firth logit
competition competition competition reputation reputation
5k 20k continuous 1000m 2000m
Intense competition −1.933∗
(= 1 if # of competitors within 5k > median) (1.035)
Intense competition −1.759∗ −2.327∗∗
(= 1 if # of competitors within 10k > median) (1.006) (1.075)
Intense competition −1.844∗
(= 1 if # of competitors within 20k > median) (1.019)
Intense competition −0.014∗
(continuous) (0.008)
Critical financial situation 1.546∗ 1.580∗ 1.876∗∗ 1.811∗∗ 1.864∗∗
(= 1 if true) (0.861) (0.862) (0.901) (0.907) (0.887)
Competence −0.800∗∗ −0.667∗∗ −0.707∗∗ −0.782∗∗ −0.754∗∗
(# of faults found out of 5) (0.318) (0.301) (0.301) (0.317) (0.312)
Low reputational concerns 2.278∗∗
(= 1 if distance < 1000m) (1.031)
Low reputational concerns 1.985∗∗ 2.126∗∗ 2.274∗∗
(= 1 if distance < 1500m) (0.991) (0.981) (1.026)
Low reputational concerns 1.885∗
(= 1 if distance < 2000m) (1.019)
Constant −0.339 −0.891 −0.365 -0.563 −0.529
(1.136) (1.086) (1.163) (1.121) (1.120)
McFadden R2 0.400 0.389 0.620 0.426 0.392
Observations 134 134 134 134 134
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
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Table 2.9: Robustness against different specifications.
Overcharging Firth logit Firth logit Firth logit
controlling controlling
for authorized for years
Intense competition −2.049∗∗ −2.043∗∗ −1.956∗
(= 1 if # of competitors > median) (1.040) (1.036) (1.160)
Critical financial situation 1.757∗∗ 1.720∗ 1.596∗
(= 1 if true) (0.891) (0.887) (0.933)
Competence −0.765∗∗ −0.747∗∗ −0.713∗∗
(# of faults found out of 5) (0.315) (0.312) (0.317)
Low reputational concerns 2.078∗∗ 2.017∗∗ 2.286∗∗
(= 1 if distance < 1500m) (0.999) (0.984) (1.056)
Authorized garage 1.037
(1.728)
Year 2006 −0.260
(1.555)
Year 2008 0.179
(1.295)
Year 2009 −1.190
(1.397)
Constant −0.510 −0.507 −0.257
(1.125) (1.119) (1.226)
McFadden R2 0.412 0.375 0.426
Observations 134 134 134
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
Considering the full dataset of 297 corporate and non-corporate garages that do
not belong to a chain, the Firth regression shows that a low competence increases
the garages’ incentive to overcharge. Low reputational concerns and an intense
competition do not have a significant influence on the incentive to overcharge in
the full dataset. This may be due to three reasons: firstly, we have shown that for
corporate garages, the financial situation has a significant impact on the garages’
overcharging behavior. As we are not able to control for the financial situation in
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Table 2.10: Robustness against full sample
Overcharging Firth logit
Intense competition −0.391
(= 1 if # of competitors > median) (0.627)
Competence −0.415∗∗
(# of faults found out of 5) (0.200)
Low reputational concerns −0.011
(= 1 if distance < 1500m) (0.664)
Constant −1.530∗
(0.789)
McFadden R2 0.106
Observations 297
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01.
p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
the unrestricted dataset, the estimates suffer from omitted variable bias. It may be
this bias leading to lower parameter estimates and thus to a lower significance level.
Secondly, non-corporate garages are more heterogeneous making it more difficult
to identify effects. The McFadden R2 amounts to 0.412 for the Firth regression
on corporate garages whereas the indicator for the model fit drops to 0.106 when
considering the whole sample. A third reason why only competence remains to
have a significant influence on the level of overcharging when considering the whole
sample may be that non-corporate garages react less sensitive to different levels of
competition and to the number of one-time interactions than corporate garages.
A possible explanation here is that non-corporate garages are often owned by self-
employed mechanics. Many of those mechanics have worked for decades in their
garage and do not adjust their overcharging behavior anymore when the competitive
environment changes or new interstates are built close to their garage.
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2.6 Conclusion
Making use of a field study, we analyze the impact of car repair shops’ reputa-
tional concerns, their financial situation, the degree of market competition, and
the garages’ competence on their incentive to overcharge. We focus on corporate
garages in our analysis and find in—accordance with theory—that firms that care
little about their reputation and those that struggle with a critical financial situa-
tion have a greater incentive to defraud their customers. On the other hand, firms
with a high competence are less likely to overcharge. While Dulleck et al. (2011) do
not find support for an effect of competition on the probability of overcharging in
their experimental study, we show that in a more competitive environment, the ex-
pert’s incentive to overcharge decreases. As such, our results provide field evidence
for many of the aspects often found in recommendations by consumer-protection
agencies.
There are two limitations of our study: firstly, the study focuses on 134 corporate
garages of which only six overcharged. The low number of observations and the
skewed distribution of overcharging challenge identification. Using Firth regression,
we account for these challenges and find considerably robust results that do not
depend on the choice of method but hold across all conventional regression methods.
The second limitation is that when considering the full dataset of 297 garages, we
find that only competence remains to have a significant influence on the level of
overcharging. Competition intensity and reputational concerns no longer have a
significant influence on the garages’ incentive to overcharge.
On a general perspective, our results may provide insights into and testable hy-
potheses for the functioning of other credence goods markets. For example, applying
our results to the health care market29, a high physician density should reduce the
physicians’ incentive to overcharge. Additionally, general practitioners with repeated
29The health care market is the largest credence goods market in most industrialized economies,
making up about 10% of the GDP (OECD, 2011). For the US, the FBI estimates that up
to 10% of those expenditures are due to fraudulent behavior (Federal Bureau of Investigation,
2007).
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patient interaction should face a lower incentive to overcharge than specialists who
are often only consulted once. Furthermore, our results may also provide important
implications for the comparison across different credence goods markets. Whereas
the cab market is characterized by one-time interactions, the market for legal advice
is usually characterized by repeated interaction. In light of our analysis, we should
expect more overcharging for taxi rides than for legal advice. Whether this is indeed
the case is left for analysis in future studies.
What Drives Fraud in a Credence Goods Market? 36
2.7 Appendix A: A Model of the Car Repair
Market: Theoretical Predictions
In the market with homogeneous customers and experts described in section 2.2,
the following result is obtained:30
Proposition 2.1. There exists a symmetric weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
the following characteristics:
(i) experts set prices pL = cL + ∆ and pH = cH > cL + ∆ (where ∆ > 0 is a
markup);
(ii) experts always recommend the major treatment if the customer has the major
problem and they recommend the major treatment with probability x ∈ (0, 1) if
the customer has the minor problem (overcharging);
(iii) customers at their first visit always accept a minor recommendation and accept
a major recommendation with probability y ∈ (0, 1) and customers who visit a
second (different) expert accept both recommendations with certainty; and
(iv) a customer who accepts a recommendation always gets sufficient treatment.
Proof. Note that result (iv) is straightforward: due to liability, experts cannot un-
dertreat their customers. Moreover, from the prices given in the proposition it
follows that the cost differential satisfies cH− cL > ∆, i.e., experts have no incentive
to overtreat their customers.
In order to fully characterize an equilibrium with the characteristics mentioned in
the proposition, consider the expert’s recommendation decision given the customer’s
acceptance decision as specified in the proposition. As mentioned in the main text,
in equilibrium, an expert consulted by a customer with a minor problem must be
30The market and the insights presented here represent one of the cases discussed by Dulleck and
Kerschbamer (2006) (see part (i) of their Lemma 6 and the respective proof). The arguments
to derive the first result closely follow their analysis.
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indifferent between recommending the minor and major treatment, i.e.,
pL − cL = y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y) (pH − cL) . (2.5)
Hence, the expert makes a strictly positive profit with the minor recommendation
with certainty. The payoff from recommending the major treatment equals a lottery:
if the recommendation is accepted which happens with a probability smaller than
one, the experts makes a profit that is higher than for the minor recommendation;
however, if the recommendation is not accepted, the payoff is equal to zero.
Next, consider customers’ acceptance decision: again as highlighted in the main
text, a customer given the major recommendation must be indifferent between re-
jecting and accepting the diagnosis, i.e.,
d =
x(1− h)
h+ x(1− h)(1− x)(pH − pL). (2.6)
Hence, the additional costs of searching for a second opinion d must equal ex-
pected savings from visiting a second expert firm (right-hand side). With prob-
ability x(1− h)/(h+ x(1− h)), the customer has a minor problem given a major
recommendation by the first expert. With probability 1 − x, the second expert is
honest and recommends the minor treatment which means that the customer saves
the cost differential pH − pL compared to the first recommendation. Note that here,
it becomes clear why a third visit does not pay off for a customer who is indiffer-
ent between accepting and rejecting a high-treatment recommendation on her first
visit: if she receives a high-treatment recommendation from a second expert, the
probability that she actually only needs the minor treatment is lower compared to
the first visit.
Furthermore, a customer who gets the minor recommendation always accepts.
This means that experts always recommend the major treatment if the the customer
the the major problem as pL < cH .
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Hence, for exogenously fixed prices pL = cL + ∆ and pH = cH > cL + ∆ as
well as for a markup ∆ such that both the recommendation probability x and the
acceptance probability y satisfy the compatibility constraints given by equations
(2.5) and (2.6) and lie in between zero and one, the situation described in parts
(i)–(iv) in the proposition is indeed part of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Now consider the case where experts set prices within the given range. Denote
by x¯ (x
¯
) the probability that an expert recommends the major treatment when
the customer has the minor (major) problem. Furthermore, a customer who is
recommended the major (minor) treatment believes that she has the major problem
with probability µ¯ (µ
¯
). Accordingly, y¯ (y
¯
) denotes the probability that a customer
accepts the recommendation of a major (minor) treatment. Last, a customer incurs
expected costs of k = d + (1 − h)(1 − x)(cL + ∆) + (h + (1 − h)x)cH > 0 when
she follows the proposed equilibrium strategy and an experts make a profit of pi =
(1−h)(1+x(1−y))∆ > 0 per customer when they stick to the proposed equilibrium
strategy.
As far as customers’ beliefs are concerned, suppose that beliefs are correct when-
ever expert charge those prices given in the proposition, i.e., µ¯(pL, pH) = (h+x2(1−
h))/(h+x(1−h)) and µ
¯
(pL, pH) = x(1−h)/(h+x(1−h)). Moreover, suppose that
for out-of-equilibrium beliefs, it holds that (i) µ¯(pL, pH) = 1 and µ
¯
(pL, pH) = 0 if and
only if pL ≤ d+ (1− x)(cL + ∆) + xcH and pH ∈ [cH , cH + d) and (ii) µ¯(pL, pH) = h
and µ
¯
(pL, pH) = 0 otherwise.
Next, consider the following acceptance decisions: (i) y
¯
(pL, pH) = 1 if and only if
pL ≤ d+ (1− x)(cL + ∆) + xcH and y
¯
(pL, pH) = 0 otherwise and (ii) y¯(pL, pH) = 1
if and only if either pL ≤ d + (1 − x)(cL + ∆) + xcH and pH ≤ cH + d or pL >
d+ (1− x)(cL + ∆) + xcH and pH ≤ k and y¯(pL, pH) else.
Suppose further that a deviating expert always recommends the major treatment
(i.e., x
¯
(pL, pH) = x¯(pL, pH) = 1), a customer never consults a deviating expert, and
the experts’ price-posting strategy stipulates that they never deviate to set prices
different from the ones given in the proposition.
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To check whether the equilibrium candidate characterized above is a weak per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium, consider first the acceptance decisions: if a single ex-
pert deviates, the proposed price vector is still available because there is at least
one remaining expert offering treatment services at these prices. Compared with
expected cost k, a customer who believes that she has the minor (major) prob-
lem with certainty faces lower (higher) costs equal to d + (1 − x)(cL + ∆) + xcH
(d+cH). Hence, customers’ acceptance decisions are optimal. Given these decisions,
x
¯
(pL, pH) = x¯(pL, pH) = 1 is optimal for a deviating expert as either y¯(pL, pH) = 1
and pH ≥ cH or y
¯
(pL, pH) = y¯(pL, pH) = 0. In light of this recommendation policy
and the observation that pH ≥ cH , customers indeed rather stay away from deviating
experts, i.e., their deviating profit is zero.
Impact of the number of firms
We consider the following adaptation of the initial market setting to analyze how
a change in the number of experts influences the incentives to overcharge: suppose
that an increase in the number of firms n leads to a decrease in search costs d(n)
as customers have to spend less time and effort searching for suitable experts.31. In
this case, we can readily state the following lemma:
Lemma 2.1. All else equal, an increase in the number of expert firms active in the
market reduces their incentive to overcharge.
Proof. In this case, the initial indifference condition regarding a customer’s accep-
tance decision given in (2.6) changes to
d(n) +
x(1− x)(1− h)
h+ x(1− h) pL +
(
1− x(1− x)(1− h)
h+ x(1− h)
)
pH = pH . (2.7)
Note that the left-hand side of equation (2.7) is lower than the one in equation
(2.6). This means that customers find a second expert more easily and hence, the
acceptance probability y of a major recommendation goes down. This in turn leads
31For example, if experts are horizontally differentiated, customers have to incur less transportation
costs to reach a second expert when the number of experts in the market goes up.
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to a decrease in the probability that an expert firm dishonestly recommending the
major treatment actually gets the business. More precisely, let χ := (y + x(1 −
y))/(1 + x(1 − y)). Then, ∂χ/∂y = 1/(1 + x(1 − y))2 > 0. As a consequence, the
scope for fraud is reduced as n increases because cheating becomes less profitable.
Impact of the financial situation
In order to analyze the effect of an expert firm’s financial situation on the incen-
tives to overcharge, consider the following change to the situation described above:
different from the initial setting, suppose that firms have identical fixed costs f to
run their business but are heterogeneous regarding their financial assets. There are
two groups of firm: firms in the first group need to attract customers as they only
have limited resources left to pay their fixed costs f . Importantly, these firms only
pay the fixed cost if they attract a customer. If they do not, they go bankrupt and
receive a payoff of zero due to their limited liability. Firms in the second group have
a much sounder financial background which means that they survive the current
period even if they incur fixed costs without serving any customer. The following
lemma takes a closer look at firms’ incentives to defraud their customers in both
groups:
Lemma 2.2. All else equal, an expert firm which is in a critical financial situation
is more likely to overcharge for its services.
Proof. In this case, the initial incentive-compatibility constraint by equation (2.5)
changes for an expert firm that is in financial distress to
pL − cL − f = y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y) (pH − cL − f) . (2.8)
Analogously, the incentive-compatibility constraint for the firm with the strong
financial background must be equal to
pL − cL − f = y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y) (pH − cL − f)−
(
1− y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y)
)
f. (2.9)
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Plugging constraint (2.8) into constraint (2.9) gives
y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y)(pH − cL − f) >
y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y)(pH − cL − f)−
1− (y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y)) f.
This means that whenever the incentive-compatibility constraint is satisfied for the
financially weak expert firm, it is also satisfied for the financially strong firm. As a
result, the latter has a lower incentive to defraud its customers as it finds it more
profitable to recommend the minor treatment whenever it is needed.
Impact of the expert’s competence
Last, we analyze the effect of an expert firm’s competence on the incentives to
overcharge. To this end, consider the following change to the above framework.
Again, there are two groups of firms. Firms in the two groups are heterogeneous
with respect to their competence. The firms in the first group are of low competence
and firms still incur costs cL and cH for the low and the major treatment. On the
other hand, the firms of high competence in the second group can offer these services
at lower costs of cL− γ and cH − γ, respectively. Given this setup, we can state the
following lemma:
Lemma 2.3. All else equal, a high-competence firm is less likely to overcharge com-
pared to its low-competence competitor.
Proof. Note first that the incentive-compatibility constraint for the low-competence
expert firm is the same as in the original setting and given by expression (2.5). The
incentive-compatibility constraint for the high-competence firm equals
pL − (cL − γ) = y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y) (pH − (cL − γ)) . (2.10)
Plugging constraint (2.5) into constraint (2.10) gives
y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y)(pH − cL) + γ >
y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y)(pH − cL + γ).
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We can thus conclude that the high-competence firm has a lower incentive to defraud
its customers.
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2.8 Appendix B: Screenshots of Data Collection
2.8.1 Overcharging
Figure 2.3: Data collection on the overcharging measurement. Source:
http://www.adac.de, accessed on January 17, 2012.
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2.8.2 Intense Competition
Figure 2.4: Data collection on the competition measurement. Source:
http://www.gelbeseiten.de, accessed on January 17, 2012.
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2.8.3 Financial Situation
Figure 2.5: Data collection on the financial situation. Source:
http://www.bundesanzeiger.de, accessed on January 17, 2012.
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2.8.4 Competence
Figure 2.6: Data collection on the competence measure. Source:
http://www.adac.de, accessed on January 17, 2012.
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2.8.5 Low Reputation
Figure 2.7: Data collection on the reputation measure. Source:
http://www.daftlogic.com, accessed on January 17, 2012.
3 Fraud and Other-Regarding
Preferences in a Market for
Credence Goods
We introduce other-regarding preferences in a credence goods model applied to the
health care market. Physicians act as experts and do not only care about their mon-
etary payoff but also about treating their patients honestly. Patients, on the other
hand, face trust costs when they anticipate to be defrauded. We study the impact
of those other-regarding preferences on the level of fraud in the market. Contrary
to intuition, we show that the level of fraud does not necessarily decrease in equilib-
rium when introducing these other-regarding preferences but may even rise. Welfare
increases with experts’ honesty but reacts ambiguously to increased patients’ trust
costs.
3.1 Introduction
Medical services are a prime example of credence goods (Darby and Karni, 1973).
The patient notices that she is ill but she does not know which disease she suffers
from. The physician performs a diagnosis and can thereby identify whether the
patient suffers from a minor or a major disease. If the treatment is not verifiable
to the patient, the physician can exploit his informational advantage by providing
the minor treatment for the minor disease and charging for performing the major
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treatment, i.e., the physician can overcharge his patient. This paper analyzes the
impact of other-regarding preferences on the level of overcharging in a credence
goods market.
Previous work on credence goods has focused on the physicians’ and patients’ mon-
etary incentives (see, e. g., Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006; Emons, 1997; Wolinsky,
1993). However, physicians do not only care about monetary incentives but also
about honesty. Dulleck et al. (2011) show in a large scale experiment that experts
like physicians base their decisions to a "considerable extent" on norms like honesty.
Even in a situation where theory would predict that experts always defraud their
customers, only half of them actually do so. In a follow-up study, Beck et al. (2011)
find that experts feel guilty when defrauding their customers. In addition to the
honesty concerns experts face, physicians take the Oath of Hippocrates swearing
that they will only act for the benefit of the sick (Pieper and Thurnherr, 1998). The
oath might give the physicians a reason to behave even more honestly than other
experts do.32 Patients, on the other hand, do not only care about their monetary
costs of the treatment. Tibandebage and Mackintosh (2005) show that in Tanzania,
where medical expenses are completely paid out of pocket, patients lose trust in the
honesty of their physician when they expect to be defrauded. Fehr and Gächter
(2002) even show that patients are willing to pay in order to punish the physician
when they presume to be cheated on.
This work introduces other-regarding preferences in a credence goods model.
Physicians face conscience costs in our model when they overcharge their patients.
Patients face trust costs when being charged a major treatment because they an-
ticipate that they may have been defrauded. We study the impact of these other-
regarding preferences on the level of overcharging when patients can consult a sec-
ond physician. A first intuition would lead to the conclusion that introducing such
preferences decreases the level of overcharging in the market. We show that this
intuition does not necessarily hold in equilibrium. An increase in trust costs can
32Ahlert et al. (2008) and Hennig-Schmidt and Wiesen (2010) provide experimental evidence for
a more honest behavior of prospective physicians compared to other subject pools.
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lead to more searches for a second opinion in equilibrium, making it more attractive
for physicians to defraud their patients.
The problem of credence goods is not limited to the health care market: the cab
ride in an unknown city (Balafoutas et al., 2013), the purchase of a highly technical
product, and a lawyer’s advice are other examples. The largest credence goods
market in most economies is the health care market though. In the US, about
2.4 trillion USD are spent per year for health care (OECD, 2011), up to 10% of
which are estimated to be due to fraud (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2007). We
therefore focus on the health care market in our paper.
Related to our work is Liu (2011). She shows that two types of equilibria may
exist in a credence goods market with a possibly selfish or conscientious monopo-
listic expert: a uniform price equilibrium in which the selfish expert free rides on
the conscientious and a non-uniform price equilibrium in which the customer can
identify the type of expert by the price list. In contrast to Liu (2011), we consider
homogeneous physicians with other-regarding preferences. We focus on the influence
of these preferences on the level of overcharging in the market rather than on the
separation of physician types.33
The remainder of the article is as follows: In section 3.2 we introduce the model
and other-regarding preferences. In section 3.3 we perform an equilibrium analysis.
The last section concludes and highlights implications.
3.2 Model
The model is built upon Wolinsky (1993): There is a continuum of patients and a
large number of physicians in the health care market. Each patient either suffers
33In our model, patients can search for a second opinion in order to discipline physicians. Contrary
to Liu (2011), we assume prices to be exogenously given as most medical markets are highly
regulated. Furthermore, we do not allow for a rejection of interaction by either party. This
is because in most countries physicians are legally obliged to treat their patients. Patients,
often, do not have a choice of whether to get treated or not because diseases aggravate. While
Liu (2011)’s results are driven by this rejection of an interaction, our results are driven by the
patients’ search for a second opinion.
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from a minor or a major disease. The patient notices that she is ill but does not
know from which disease she suffers. It is common knowledge that the patient has a
major disease with probability h or a minor disease with probability 1−h. Physicians
are able to costlessly diagnose the disease. If the patient accepts the diagnosis, the
physician treats the patient. Treating the major disease induces costs of cH for the
physicians, treating the minor disease of cL < cH . Patients derive a utility of B
when they are treated.
Patients cannot verify the treatment. Therefore, physicians can overcharge their
patients given that they suffer from a minor disease. Undertreatment is ruled out
because physicians are assumed to be liable. In order to discipline physicians, pa-
tients can search for a second opinion. Searching for a physician induces costs d for
the patient. The physician does not know whether a patient is on her first or second
visit. It is assumed that B is large enough so that getting treated makes the patient
always better off than no treatment.
In contrast to Wolinsky (1993) physicians and patients do not only follow mon-
etary incentives but also care about honesty and trust. Ariely and Mazar (2006)
show that experts like physicians trade-off between pursuing their own financial
goals and being honest. They find that people "possess internal reward mechanisms
for honesty" that "limit dishonest behavior." Physicians therefore face conscience
costs in our model when they overcharge their patient. Gneezy (2005) shows that
the non-monetary costs of defrauding increase with an increasing loss of the other
party. Consequently, we model a physician’s conscience costs by subtracting a share
β of his fraudulent profit.
Patients, on the other hand, lose trust in their physician when they are confronted
with a major diagnosis. This is because they anticipate that they may have been
overcharged (Tibandebage and Mackintosh, 2005). We therefore add trust costs of
α weighted by the probability of being defrauded. Thus, an increase in the market
level of fraud implies higher trust costs.
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We assume prices for the treatments to be exogenously given, e. g. by a regulator.
The price for the major treatment amounts to pH = cH , the price for the minor
treatment to pL = cL + e. e represents the mark-up on the low cost treatment
and ensures an incentive for the physician to treat his patient honestly. The reason
for assuming fixed prices is that in many medical markets we can indeed observe
exogenously given prices, either because of a bargaining process on a central level
(as in the US) or by legal regulations (as e. g. in Germany) (Sülzle and Wambach,
2005).
The patient is not insured against health risks in our model. Consequently, the
treatment costs are completely borne by the patient herself. The impact of insurance
is discussed in section 3.2.1. Health insurance does not change any of our results as
long as the patient faces a co-payment.
The game structure is as follows:
1. Nature determines the severity of the patient’s disease: With probability h
the patient suffers from a major disease, with probability 1− h from a minor
disease.
2. The patient chooses a physician and incurs search costs d.
3. The physician learns the patient’s disease. Given that the patient suffers from
a minor disease, the physician diagnoses a minor disease with probability 1−x
(x ∈ [0, 1]) and a major disease with probability x. Given that the patient
suffers from a major disease, the physician diagnoses a major disease with
probability 1.
4. The patient accepts all minor diagnoses and rejects a major diagnosis with
probability 1− y (y ∈ [0, 1]).
5. If the patient accepts the diagnosis, the physician will charge accordingly.
Otherwise the patient turns to a second physician and again incurs search
costs d. She will then accept any diagnosis with certainty.
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The physician’s payoff is given as pi−cj if the patient accepts the diagnosis, where
i, j ∈ {L,H}. Otherwise, the physician’s payoff is 0. The patient’s payoff is given
by B − pi − nd. n ∈ {1, 2} indicates the number of physician visits.
The physician’s diagnosis is a signal to the patient about her type of disease.
When receiving a diagnosis at her first visit, the patient updates her beliefs about
her type. When receiving a minor diagnosis, the patient beliefs with probability 1
that she suffers from a minor disease. When receiving a major diagnosis, the patient
beliefs to suffer from a minor disease with probability (1−h)x
h+(1−h)x . (1 − h)x is the
probability of having a minor problem and being overcharged. h+ (1− h)x reflects
the probability of receiving a major diagnosis. In the following two subsections
we derive the patients’ and the physicians’ optimal strategy before turning to the
(perfect Bayesian) market equilibria.
3.2.1 Patients’ Optimization Problem
The patient maximizes her expected utility by choosing the optimal acceptance rate
y of a major diagnosis. Suppose physicians overcharge their patients with probability
x. Then the cost function of the patient is given as:
C(y) = d+ (1− h)(1− x)(cL + e) + [h+ (1 + α)(1− h)x]ycH (3.1)
+ [h+ (1− h)x](1− y)
[
d+
(1− h)x(1− x)(cL + e) + [h+ (1 + α)(1− h)x2]cH
h+ (1− h)x
]
The patient incurs search costs d for her first visit at a physician. With probability
1− h the patient suffers from a minor disease. With probability 1− x the physician
honestly diagnoses a minor disease. Patients accept a minor diagnosis with certainty
because they know that the physicians cannot undertreat. Patients then incur costs
of cL+e. With probability h+(1−h)x the patient receives the diagnosis of a major
disease. The physician then charges cH . With probability (1−h)x the patient is over-
charged, inducing trust costs of αycH . The patient accepts the major diagnosis with
probability y and searches for a second opinion with probability 1 − y. Given that
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the patient searches for a second opinion she incurs additional search costs d and ex-
pected costs of being treated of (1− h)x(1− x)(cL + e) + [h+ (1 + α)(1− h)x2]cH .
The patient now accepts both diagnoses with probability 1. With probability
(1− h)x2 the patient is defrauded again and therefore again bears trust costs of
αcH .
Note that the expected trust costs do not only increase with the overcharging
probability x but also with a higher acceptance rate of a major diagnosis y. If the
patient never accepts a major diagnosis (y = 0), she does not face trust costs for the
first physician. As patients always accept the second diagnosis, the patient always
faces expected trust costs of αx2cH for the second visit of a physician.
The patient trades off between accepting a major diagnosis knowing that she
might have been overcharged and costly rejecting the diagnosis. She searches for a
second opinion with probability 1 (0) if and only if the costs for a second opinion
are smaller (greater) than the expected costs of being overcharged, i. e.
d < (>)
[
(1− h)x
h+ (1− h)x
]
(1− x)[(1 + α)cH − cL − e] (3.2)
In the following, we assume the search costs d to be smaller than (1+α)cH−cL−e.
Otherwise, it is a patient’s best response to always accept a major diagnosis from
the first physician she visits and to never search for a second opinion.
For the patient to be indifferent between searching for a second opinion and ac-
cepting the diagnosis of a major disease both terms have to be equal. Then any
y ∈ [0, 1] would be a best response.
Note that equation (3.2) is quadratic in x. Solving for the optimal search strategy
y for a given x yields:
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Lemma 3.1. Given a symmetric overcharging strategy by the physicians x ∈ [0, 1],
the patients’ best response correspondence is given by:
y∗(x) ∈

0 if x ∈ (x1, x2)
1 if x ∈ [0, x1) ∪ (x2, 1]
[0, 1] if x ∈ {x1, x2}
where
x1/2 =
1
2
(
1− d
[(1 + α)cH − cL − e]
)
±
√
1
4
(
1− d
[(1 + α)cH − cL − e]
)2
− h
1− h
d
[(1 + α)cH − cL − e] (3.3)
Proof. See Appendix 3.5.1.
The results of Lemma 3.1 can be seen in Figure 3.1. Patients accept a major
diagnosis at the first physician if the level of fraud in the market is low (i. e., x <
x1). This is because patients anticipate that the physician most probably diagnosed
honestly. Patients also accept a major diagnosis if the level of fraud in the market is
high (x > x2) as the second physician will most probably diagnose a major disease,
too. If x1 < x < x2 holds, the patient will search for a second opinion.
We now analyze how a change in trust costs changes the search behavior of pa-
tients.
Proposition 3.1. An increase in the patients’ trust costs ceteris paribus increases
the probability of rejecting a major diagnosis from the first physician.
Proof. See Appendix 3.5.2.
The result of Proposition 3.1 is displayed in Figure 3.1. An increase in the patients’
trust costs results in an increase in their expected costs of being defrauded. Thus,
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y
x
1
1
x1 x2xc
y∗(x)
α ↑ α ↑
Figure 3.1: Patients’ best response correspondence after increase in trust costs.
searching for a second opinion becomes more attractive for patients. In consequence,
the probability of rejecting a major diagnosis from the first physician increases.
Note that an increase in the patients’ trust costs has the same effect as if the
patients were insured and co-payments were increased (Sülzle and Wambach, 2005).
Increasing co-payments makes the patients bear a larger share of their treatment
costs. This implies that patients also pay a larger share of the fraudulent costs.
Thus, the probability of searching for a second opinion increases.
3.2.2 Physicians’ Optimization Problem
Physician i maximizes his profit Πi by choosing the optimal level of overcharging
xi. Due to the given price structure the physician can only make positive profits
with patients suffering from a minor disease. Suppose that patients accept a major
diagnosis on their first visit with probability y, and all other physicians overcharge
the patient with probability x. Then the profit function of each individual physician
i yields the following:
max
xi
Πi = (1− xi)e+ (1− β)xi
[
y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y)
]
(cH − cL) (3.4)
With probability 1 − xi, the physician diagnoses patients with a minor disease
honestly. An honest diagnosis ensures the physician the certain profit e. With
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probability xi, the physician overcharges his patients suffering from a minor disease.
1
1+x(1−y) of the patients are on their first visit and accept the major diagnosis with
probability y. x(1−y)
1+x(1−y) patients were diagnosed a major disease at another physician,
and therefore accept a major diagnosis with certainty. The share of the fraudulent
profit β
[
y+x(1−y)
1+x(1−y)
]
(cH − cL) that is being subtracted reflects the conscience costs
the physician faces when defrauding his patients.
The physician trades off between overcharging patients with a minor disease
and treating them honestly. While defrauding yields a higher monetary profit
cH − cL > e it includes the risk that patients might consult another physician. Thus,
the physician’s best response is to overcharge any patient suffering from a minor dis-
ease with probability 1 (0), if
e < (>)(1− β)
[
y + x(1− y)
1 + x(1− y)
]
(cH − cL) (3.5)
The physician is indifferent between both actions if the mark-up on treating the
minor disease equals the expected profit of defrauding. The individual physician’s
best response is therefore given as:
xi
∗(x, y) ∈

{0} if e > (1− β)
[
y+x(1−y)
1+x(1−y)
]
(cH − cL),
{1} if e < (1− β)
[
y+x(1−y)
1+x(1−y)
]
(cH − cL)
[0, 1] if e = (1− β)
[
y+x(1−y)
1+x(1−y)
]
(cH − cL),
Concentrating on symmetric responses, it has to hold that the physician’s individ-
ual defrauding strategy xi corresponds to the other physician’s defrauding strategy
x. The optimal symmetric defrauding strategy depending on the level of conscience
costs is given by the following Lemma:
Fraud and Other-Regarding Preferences 58
Lemma 3.2. Given the patients’ acceptance strategy y, the physicians’ symmetric
best response for small conscience costs, i. e. β < 1− e(2−y)
cH−cL , is:
x∗(y) ∈

{
0,
e− y(1− β)(cH − cL)
(1− y)[(1− β)(cH − cL)− e] , 1
}
if y ∈
[
0,
e
(1− β)(cH − cL)
]
{1} if y ∈
[
e
(1− β)(cH − cL) , 1
]
For medium conscience costs, i. e. 1 − e(2−y)
cH−cL ≤ β ≤ 1 − ecH−cL , the physicians’
symmetric best response is given by:
x∗(y) ∈

{0} if y ∈
[
0,
e
(1− β)(cH − cL)
]
{1} if y ∈
[
e
(1− β)(cH − cL) , 1
]
For large conscience costs, i. e. β > 1 − e
cH−cL , the physicians’ symmetric best
response is given by:
x∗(y) ∈ {0}
Proof. See Appendix 3.5.3.
Obviously, for large conscience costs the physicians’ best response it to always
diagnose honestly. For small and medium conscience costs, the physicians’ best
response is a joint best response to the patients’ and the other physicians’ behavior.
Given that patients accept a major diagnosis sufficiently often (i. e., y is large), it is
a physician’s best response to always defraud patients with a minor disease (x = 1).
Given that patients rarely accept a major diagnosis, the physician’s best response
depends on the other physicians’ strategy: If the other physicians defraud (x = 1),
it is the physician’s best response to also defraud his patients. This is because he
knows that many of his patients are searching for a second opinion and therefore
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accept any diagnosis with certainty. If the other physicians behave honestly (x = 0),
it is the physician’s best response to also behave honestly. This is because many
patients are on their first visit and would search for a second opinion if receiving
a major diagnosis. For small conscience costs β < 1 − e(2−y)
cH−cL , there also exists a
region (the dashed line in Figure 3.2) for which physicians are indifferent between
overcharging and charging honestly.
Increasing the physician’s conscience costs ceteris paribus reduces the physician’s
profit of overcharging
(
dΠ
dβ
< 0
)
. From the physician’s individual best response we
see that after an increase in conscience costs from β0 to β1 ≤ 1 − ecH−cL , it is the
physician’s best response to now even treat a patient with a minor disease honestly
if y ∈
[
e
(1−β0)(cH−cL) ,
e
(1−β1)(cH−cL)
]
. If β1 > 1 − ecH−cL , it is the physician’s best
response to now always treat the patient honestly.
Proposition 3.2. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the physicians’ conscience costs
decreases their incentive to overcharge.
Proof. Follows immediately from the physician’s individual best response.
Figure 3.2 illustrates Proposition 3.2.
y
x
1
1
e
(1−β)(cH−cL)−e
e
(1−β)(cH−cL)
x∗(y)
β
Figure 3.2: Physicians’ best response correspondence after increase in conscience
costs (for the case of small conscience costs).
Fraud and Other-Regarding Preferences 60
3.3 Equilibria of the Model
The market equilibria are obtained by joining the patients’ and the physicians’ best
response. In order to discriminate the effects of introducing patients’ trust costs and
physicians’ conscience costs, we first consider the benchmark case where patients and
physicians only account for monetary incentives, i. e. α = β = 0.
3.3.1 Equilibria without Other-Regarding Preferences
In a market without other-regarding preferences, Sülzle and Wambach (2005) show
that the following Lemma holds:
Lemma 3.3. For 0 < 1− e(2−y)
cH−cL and sufficiently small d, there exist three equilibria:
In the two mixed strategy equilibria physicians sometimes defraud patients facing
a minor disease. Patients sometimes search for a second opinion if they receive a
major diagnosis. In the pure strategy equilibrium, physicians always defraud and
patients never search for a second opinion.
If 1 − e(2−y)
cH−cL ≤ 0 ≤ 1 − ecH−cL , there only exists an equilibrium in pure strategies
in which physicians always defraud and patients never search for a second opinion.
If 0 > 1 − e
cH−cL , there exists only an equilibrium in pure strategies in which
physicians never defraud and patients never search for a second opinion.
Proof. See Sülzle and Wambach (2005).
The interesting case is when 0 < 1− e
cH−cL , i. e. the mark-up for a minor treatment
is smaller than the difference in costs between major and minor treatment. Then the
intuition for the equilibria is as follows: In the equilibrium of pure strategies (A),
patients always accept the diagnosis of a major disease (see Figure 3.3). Therefore,
it is the physician’s best response to always defraud his patients suffering from a
minor disease. Anticipating the physicians’ behavior, it is a patient’s best response
to always accept the diagnosis of a major disease because any other physician would
defraud the patient, too. In equilibrium B and C, the patients are indifferent be-
tween accepting a major diagnosis and costly searching for another opinion while
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the physicians are indifferent between diagnosing honestly and defrauding a patient
with a minor disease. If 0 > 1 − e
cH−cL it never pays for a physician to defraud a
patient. The patient’s best response is therefore to always accept a major diagnosis.
y
x
1
1
y∗(x)
x∗(y)
B
C
A
Figure 3.3: Equilibria without other-regarding preferences.
3.3.2 Equilibria with Patients’ Trust Costs
Now let us turn to the case where patients lose trust in their physician by a possible
overcharging while physicians only care about their monetary profit, i. e. α > 0 and
β = 0. A first intuition would lead to the conclusion that an increase of patients’
trust costs increases the probability of searching for a second opinion and therefore
decreases the physicians’ incentive to overcharge. This intuition only partly holds
in equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3. An increase in the patients’ trust costs leads to the following
changes in the three possible equilibria:
1. At equilibrium B′, there is less fraud in the market than in B. Patients search
less often for a second opinion than in B.
2. At equilibrium C ′, there is more fraud in the market than in C. Patients search
more often for a second opinion than in C.
3. At equilibrium A, there are no changes.
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Proof. See Appendix 3.5.4.
Proposition 3.3 is illustrated in Figure 3.4. Starting from equilibrium, an increase
in the probability of searching for a second opinion makes the physician strictly
better off if he diagnoses honestly. If a physician is honest, it is the patient’s best
response to stay at the first physician she visits. In the emerging equilibria, the
two effects have to be balanced. Starting from equilibrium B, overcharging in fact
decreases and patients search less often for a second opinion than in B. Starting
from equilibrium C, the effects are reverse: As more patients search for a second
opinion, the physicians anticipate that more patients accept the (second) diagnosis
with certainty. Therefore, the physicians’ incentive to overcharge increases. Note
that both effects – the change in the acceptance rate and the change in the level of
fraud – are opposite compared to equilibrium B. Equilibrium A remains unchanged.
y
x
1
1
y∗(x)
x∗(y)
BB
′
C
C ′
A
α ↑ α ↑
Figure 3.4: Change in equilibria after increase in patients’ trust costs.
An increase in the patients’ trust costs does not only influence the level of over-
charging. Through the change in the number of searches for a second opinion, welfare
is also affected since each visit at a physician induces search costs of d. Welfare is
maximized if patients visit only one physician. Starting from equilibrium B, an
increase in trust costs decreases the number of second physician visits. Welfare is
therefore increased. Again, the opposite holds starting from equilibrium C. Note
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that overcharging is a pure redistribution between patients and physicians and does
therefore not impact welfare.
3.3.3 Equilibria with Physicians’ Conscience Costs
In a situation where physicians face conscience costs while patients do not account
for trust costs, i. e. α = 0 and β > 0, the following holds:
Proposition 3.4. An increase in the physicians’ conscience costs does not change
the level of fraud in the market as long as conscience costs do not change from small
to medium/large or from medium to large. If conscience costs are small, an increase
in conscience costs leads to fewer searches for a second opinion.
Proof. See Appendix 3.5.5.
If conscience costs are small, an increase in conscience costs does not lead to
less overcharging but to a lower search frequency in equilibrium. Fewer searches
increase welfare as each search causes costs of d. Equilibrium A does not change.
As a consequence, the level of fraud remains unchanged in all three equilibria.
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y∗(x)
x∗(y)
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C ′′
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β
Figure 3.5: Change in equilibria after increase in physicians’ conscience costs
(for the case of small conscience costs).
The above analysis assumes that the increase in conscience costs does not result in
a change from small to medium/large or medium to large conscience costs. Relaxing
Fraud and Other-Regarding Preferences 64
this assumption leads to a discontinuity in the physicians’ best response at the inter-
val boundaries: An increase from small to medium conscience costs then increases
the level of fraud in the market if the equilibrium was in mixed strategies (B or C).
This is because the two mixed strategy equilibria do not exist when conscience costs
are medium. Instead, the only market equilibrium is the pure strategy equilibrium
in which physicians always defraud and patients always search for a second opinion.
An increase from small/medium to large conscience costs changes the physicians’
behavior to a purely honest behavior because the conscience costs then exceed the
fraudulent profit.
3.3.4 Equilibria with Patients’ Trust Costs and Physicians’
Conscience Costs
Accounting for both, patients’ trust costs and physicians’ conscience costs, i. e. α > 0
and β > 0, leads to the following results:
Proposition 3.5. Increasing patients’ trust costs and physicians’ conscience costs
leads to the following changes in the three possible equilibria if conscience costs are
small:
1. At equilibrium B′′′, the level of fraud in the market decreases compared to
equilibrium B while patients search less often for a second opinion.
2. At equilibrium C ′′′, the level of fraud rises compared to equilibrium C. Whether
patients search for a second opinion more or less often depends on the cost
ratio: If the ratio of trust to conscience costs is high, we observe less searches
in C ′′′ than in C while if the ratio is low, we observe more.
3. Equilibrium A remains unchanged.
If conscience costs are medium, physicians always overcharge their patients in
equilibrium and patients never search for a second opinion. If conscience costs are
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large, physicians always diagnose honestly and patients never search for a second
opinion.
Proof. See Appendix 3.5.6.
The Proposition is illustrated in Figure 3.6. Starting from equilibrium B, an
increase in the patients trust costs and the physicians’ conscience costs leads to fewer
searches and therefore to an increase in social welfare. Starting from equilibrium
C, increasing the impact of the other-regarding preferences increases welfare if the
ratio of trust costs to conscience costs is high but decreases welfare if the ratio is
low.
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Figure 3.6: Equilibria after increase in trust and conscience costs given a high
(low) cost ratio on the left (right).
3.4 Conclusion
We analyze the impact of an increase in other-regarding preferences on the physi-
cians’ level of fraud. In contrast to intuition, we find that an increase in conscience
costs and trust costs does not necessarily decrease the level of fraud in the market,
nor does it necessarily decrease the level of second opinions.
Increasing patients’ trust costs ceteris paribus increases the probability of a search
for a second opinion. Starting from equilibrium, increasing the trust costs reduces
the level of fraud in the market if the level was low before, but increases the level of
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fraud if the level was high. The increase in fraud is due to the fact that an increase
in trust costs can lead to more searches for a second opinion in equilibrium, making
it more attractive for physicians to defraud their patients. Increasing physicians’
conscience costs ceteris paribus decreases their incentive to overcharge. Starting
from equilibrium, the introduction of conscience costs does not change the level of
fraud because the higher incentive to diagnose honestly is set off by fewer searches
for a second opinion by the patients.
Welfare depends on the number of searches for second opinions and on the ratio
of trust to conscience costs. An increase in the patients’ trust costs increases (de-
creases) welfare if the equilibrium is characterized by a low (high) level of fraud.
An increase in the physicians’ conscience costs always increases welfare. Increasing
both costs leads to a higher welfare in case of the low fraud equilibrium. In case of
the high fraud equilibrium, welfare increases if the ratio of trust to conscience costs
is high.
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3.5 Appendix: Proofs
3.5.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
Suppose x ∈ [0, 1]. Rearranging inequality 3.2 (with an equal sign) and substituting
with c = d
(1+α)cH−cL−e < 1 yields:
x2 − (1− c)x+
(
h
1− h
)
c = 0 (3.6)
The x1 and x2 from Lemma 3.1 are the (real) solutions to equation (3.6) if
(1− c)2 − 4
(
h
1− h
)
c > 0 (3.7)
From equation 3.6 it follows that for x < x1 and x > x2 the patient will strictly
prefer to accept a major diagnosis from the first physician, i. e. to choose y = 1.
If x1 < x < x2, it is a patients best response to reject the major diagnosis and to
search for a second opinion, i. e. to choose y = 0.
3.5.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Taking the partial derivative of x with respect to α in equation (3.2) yields:
d =
(1− h)x(α)
h+ (1− h)x(α)(1− x(α))[(1 + α)cH − cL − e]
⇔ 0 =
[
(1− h) dx
dα
h+ (1− h)x(α) −
(1− h)2x dx
dα
(h+ (1− h)x(α))2
]
(1− x(α))[(1 + α)cH − cL − e]
−
[
(1− h)x(α)
h+ (1− h)x(α)
]
dx
dα
[(1 + α)cH − cL − e] +
[
(1− h)x(α)
h+ (1− h)x(α)
]
(1− x(α))cH
=
dx
dα
[1− (1− h)x(α)
h+ (1− h)x(α)
]
(1− x(α))[(1 + α)cH − cL − e]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=d
− dx
dα
x(α)[(1 + α)cH − cL − e]− x2cH + xcH
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⇔ dx
dα
= − x(1− x)cH
(1− 2x)[(1 + α)cH − cL − e]− d (3.8)
The numerator is always positive, the denominator is positive if x < xc and nega-
tive if x > xc with xc = 12
[
1− d
(1+α)cH−cL−e
]
. Given the solutions from Lemma (3.1),
it holds that dx
dα
> 0 for x2 and dxdα < 0 for x1.
3.5.3 Proof of Lemma 3.2
Note that if β > 1 − e
cH−cL it is obviously the physicians’ best response to always
charge honestly because the conscience costs exceed the fraudulent profit. We there-
fore assume β < 1− e
cH−cL in the following.
Depending on the patients’ symmetric strategy y ∈ [0, 1], we distinguish three
situations following Sülzle and Wambach (2005):
1. Patients always accept a major diagnosis from the first physician (y = 1):
Rearranging inequality (3.5) yields the following:
e

>
=
<
 (1− β)(cH − cL) (3.9)
It is physician i’s best response to always overcharge his patient (xi = 1)
because the fraudulent profit (1 − β)(cH − cL) exceeds the profit from an
honest diagnosis e.
2. Patients always reject a major diagnosis from the first physician (y = 0):
Rearranging inequality (3.5) yields the following:
e

>
=
<
 (1− β)
[
x
1 + x
]
(cH − cL) (3.10)
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The physician’s best response depends on the other physicians’ behavior. We
distinguish three cases:
• If all other physicians diagnose honestly, i. e. x = 0, equation (3.10)
reduces to e > 0. Consequently, it is physician i’s best response to also
diagnose honestly xi = 0. This is because y = 0 implies that every patient
with a minor disease is on his first visit. If physician i diagnosed a major
treatment, the patient would reject the diagnosis with certainty and the
physician would make zero profits.
• If all other physicians defraud their patients (x = 1), it is physician i’s
best response to also defraud his patient given that β ≤ 1− 2e
cH−cL . Physi-
cian i anticipates that there are sufficiently many patients with a minor
disease that are on their second visit. They accept a major diagnosis
with certainty. If β ≥ 1− 2e
cH−cL , x = 1 is not a symmetric best response
because the deviation strategy xi = 0 would yield higher profits than
xi = 1.
• If all other physicians randomize their behavior (x ∈ (0, 1)), a best sym-
metric response requires physician i to be indifferent between an honest
and a fraudulent diagnosis for a patient with a minor disease. From re-
arranging inequality (3.5) with an equal sign with regard to x we know
that indifference holds if and only if
x =
e
(1− β)(cH − cL)− e (3.11)
A symmetric best response exists if and only if β < 1 − 2e
cH−cL . If
β > 1− 2e
cH−cL , an individual physician would again have the incentive
to deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
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3. Patients do not always but sometimes accept a major diagnosis from the first
physician (y ∈ (0, 1)). Rearranging inequality (3.5) (with an equal sign) yields:
(1− β)y(cH − cL) + (1− β)x(1− y)(cH − cL − e)− e = 0 (3.12)
Partial differentiation shows that
dx
dy
= −(cH − cL)− x(cH − cL − e)
(1− y)(cH − cL − e) < 0 (3.13)
An increase in y leads to a decrease in x. This is because physicians need
fewer patients with a minor disease to be indifferent between defrauding and
diagnosing honestly. We again distinguish three cases:
• If the other physicians diagnose honestly (x = 0), equation (3.12) is
fulfilled if and only if
y =
e
(1− β)(cH − cL) (3.14)
Consequently, it is a physician’s best response to diagnose honestly (xi = 0)
for low enough y
(
y ∈
[
0, e
(1−β)(cH−cL)
])
.
• If the other physicians always defraud (x = 1), it is a physician’s best
response to also defraud (xi = 1) if and only if
(1− β)y(cH − cL) + (1− β)x(1− y)(cH − cL − e)− e > 0 (3.15)
This is given if β < 1− e(2−y)
cH−cL .
• If the physicians sometimes but not always defraud their patients (x ∈ (0, 1)),
the individual physician i is indifferent between defrauding and diagnos-
ing honestly if and only if
x =
e− y(1− β)(cH − cL)
(1− y[(1− β)(cH − cL)− e]) (3.16)
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x ∈ (0, 1) if and only if β < 1 − e(2−y)
cH−cL . According to equation (3.13) x
decreases in y and reaches the value 0 for y = e
(1−β)(cH−cL) .
3.5.4 Proof of Proposition 3.3
As shown in Proposition 3.1, an increase in the patients’ trust costs leads to a
change in the patients’ best response correspondence. There is no direct influence
on the physicians’ best response but an indirect influence through the change in the
patients’ behavior. The change can be obtained by taking the total differential of
inequality 3.2 and 3.5 (with an equal sign):
dy
dα
= − x(1− x)(1− y)cH(cH − cL − e)
[(1− 2x)[(1 + α)cH − cL − e]− d][x(cH − cL − e)− (cH − cL)] (3.17)
The numerator is always positive. The sign of the denominator depends on x. Note
that we obtain the same critical value xc as in Proposition 3.3. For x < xc it holds
that the denominator is negative so that dy
dα
> 0 while for x > xc the denominator
is positive so that dy
dα
< 0.
3.5.5 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Assume that the increase in conscience costs is marginal in the sense that the in-
crease does not switch the costs from small to medium/large or medium to large.
Then if the conscience costs are small, the emerging equilibria B′′ and C ′′ always ex-
ist. This is because d
dβ
e
(1−β)(cH−cL)−e > 0, i. e. the intersection of the physicians’ best
response and the abscissa is shifted to the right. This in turn ensures the existence
of two intersections between the physicians’ and the patients’ best response.
As seen in Proposition 3.2, an increase in the physicians’ conscience costs ceteris
paribus decreases the physicians’ level of overcharging. However, the optimal level
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of overcharging does not change in the two mixed strategy equilibria B′′ and C ′′ as
x1/2 =
1
2
(
1− d
[(1 + α)cH − cL − e]
)
±
√
1
4
(
1− d
[(1 + α)cH − cL − e]
)2
− h
1− h
d
[(1 + α)cH − cL − e]
⇒ ∂x1/2
∂β
= 0
Note that in the pure strategy equilibrium A, the level of overcharging does not
change with increasing conscience costs, either.
The increase in conscience costs does not have a direct influence on the patients’
best response. But there is an indirect influence that increases the patients’ accep-
tance rate y in equilibria B′′ and C ′′. The indirect effect is obtained by taking the
total differential of inequality 3.5 (with an equal sign):
dx = − 1
(1− y)2dy +
e(cH − cL)
((1− β)(cH − cL)− e)2dβ = 0
⇒ dy
dβ
=
(1− y)2(cH − cL)e
[(1− β)(cH − cL)− e]2 > 0 (3.18)
For medium and large conscience costs the respective equilibrium in pure strategies
still exists.
3.5.6 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Changes in the physicians’ behavior follow immediately from Proposition 3.3 and
3.4.
Suppose the physicians’ conscience costs are small. Then the change in the pa-
tients’ acceptance rate of a major diagnosis is given by:
dy =
∂y
∂α︸︷︷︸
> 0 for x < xc
< 0 for x > xc
dα +
∂y
∂β︸︷︷︸
>0
dβ
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= − x(1− x)(1− y)cH(cH − cL − e)
[(1− 2x)[(1 + α)cH − cL − e]− d][x(cH − cL − e)− (cH − cL)]dα
+
(1− y)2(cH − cL)e
[(1− β)(cH − cL)− e]2dβ (3.19)
For x < xc = 12
[
1− d
(1+α)cH−cL−e
]
, dy
dα
and dy
dβ
are positive. An increase in both
costs therefore increases the patients’ acceptance rate starting from equilibrium B.
For x > xc, dydα is negative while
dy
dβ
remains positive. The overall effect starting
from equilibrium C therefore depends on the cost ratio: Assume α increases for a
fixed β. Then the denominator of dy
dα
increases, the absolute value of the fraction
decreases. We can therefore conclude, that if the ratio of trust to conscience costs
is high, an increase in trust and conscience costs increases the patients’ acceptance
rate (i. e. the number of searches for a second opinion decreases). If the ratio is low,
the acceptance rate decreases with increasing costs.
If physicians’ conscience costs are medium or large, an increase in the other-
regarding preferences does not change the players’ behavior (see Lemma 3.2).
4 Reputation in Credence Goods
Markets—Experimental Evidence
We experimentally investigate how the intensity of price competition and the possi-
bility to build up reputation influence an expert’s incentive to defraud his customers
in a market for credence goods. We apply a 2 × 2 factorial design varying the rep-
utation mechanism (private vs. public histories) and the pricing regime (flexible vs.
fixed prices). In contrast to private histories, public histories imply that customers
do not only build up their own history but customers observe all customers’ histo-
ries in terms of undertreatments and prices charged. Our results show that the level
of undertreatment and the level of overcharging are significantly lower under fixed
than under flexible prices. The level of overcharging is weak significantly higher un-
der public than under private histories if prices are flexible while the opposite holds
when prices are fixed. We find the same pattern for the level of undertreatment but
differences are not significant.
4.1 Introduction
In this paper, we experimentally investigate an expert’s incentive to defraud his
customers under different reputation mechanisms and pricing regimes in a credence
goods market. In such a market, the customer knows that she suffers from a problem
but does not know which type of treatment she needs. The customer must rely on
an expert’s advice as to which treatment is necessary (Darby and Karni, 1973). The
expert’s informational advantage may give rise to fraudulent behavior. We look at
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markets where a customer cannot observe the expert’s treatment. Hence, an expert
may have an incentive to charge for a more expensive treatment than he actually
performed, i. e., the expert may overcharge. Furthermore, the expert may provide a
service that is insufficient, i. e., he may undertreat. While customers cannot observe
whether they were overcharged even ex-post, customers can verify whether they
were undertreated.
Reputation mechanisms may be a feasible instrument to help alleviate expert
fraud (Hilger, 2011). Thus, it is important to understand whether and how different
reputation mechanisms affect an expert’s fraudulent behavior. Previous literature
on reputation in credence goods markets has focused on the analysis of a reputation
mechanism where each customer can identify the expert she interacts with as op-
posed to a situation where customers cannot identify experts (Dulleck et al., 2011).
If a customer can identify the expert she interacts with, the customer builds up her
private history with respect to undertreatment and prices charged. Thus, we will re-
fer to this mechanism as private history mechanism throughout this paper. Dulleck
et al. (2011) find that in a competitive market with flexible prices, introducing a
private history mechanism neither reduces the level of undertreatment nor the level
of overcharging. The contribution of the present paper is twofold: firstly, this work
allows for a reputation mechanism that enables customers to observe all customers’
histories with respect to undertreatment and prices charged instead of only their
own history. We will call this reputation mechanism public history mechanism in
the following. Secondly, we allow for reputation building in a market with fixed
prices.
Our first contribution is motivated by the recent emergence of public online feed-
back platforms in credence goods markets. These feedback platforms enable cus-
tomers to share their history. Intuitively, there are two opposing effects that public
histories might have on the expert’s incentive to defraud: on the one hand, public
histories facilitate customers’ reaction to experts’ defrauding behavior. If an ex-
pert undertreats a customer, under public histories all customers observe that the
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customer’s problem was not fixed. Customers respond to the undertreatment by
choosing a different expert in future periods. Thus, the expert undertreating loses
most (or all) customers in future periods under public histories. Under private his-
tories, however, the undertreatment is only observed by the customer undertreated.
Thus, the expert undertreating may only lose this single customer. While customers
can perfectly react to experts who undertreat, a response to experts who overcharge
is based on customers’ expectation about experts’ overcharging behavior. The cus-
tomers’ expectation in turn is based on the prices charged in previous periods. Under
public histories, customers observe all prices charged. Hence, customers can base
their expectation about an expert’s overcharging behavior on more observations
than under private histories. Thus, the expert’s incentive to defraud his customers
should be lower under public than under private histories. On the other hand, if
customers can easily switch to experts they expect not to be defrauded by, experts
who defraud may try to balance their bad reputation by posting lower prices. If the
posted price difference between experts who do and do not defraud is sufficiently
large, customers may choose experts offering a low price. A low price in turn makes
it less attractive for the expert to treat sufficiently and to charge honestly. Hence,
public histories might lead to an increase in the level of fraud. The second effect
does not apply if prices are fixed.
The second contribution we make to the literature is to consider reputation mecha-
nisms in markets with fixed prices. Several credence goods markets are characterized
by a fixed-price regime, among them the largest credence goods market: the health
care market. In Germany, expenditures in the health care market amounted to
264 billion Euro in the year 2008 (Statistisches Bundesamt (Ed.), 2012), of which
Transparency International estimates up to 20 billion Euro to be due to fraud (Trans-
parency International - Deutschland e.V. (Ed.), 2008). Under fixed prices, the ex-
pert’s strategic choices are restricted to whether the expert undertreats and whether
he overcharges but there is no possibility to post prices. Thus, experts only compete
in two defrauding dimensions but not in terms of prices posted. Hence, customers
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exclusively choose an expert based on his defrauding history. Thus, we expect a
lower level of fraud under fixed than under flexible prices.
A prime example that emphasizes the relevance of our investigation is the Arztnav-
igator (“physician navigator”) in Germany. The Arztnavigator is a public feedback
platform that was established by the three largest statutory health insurance com-
panies in order to assist the insuree in finding a good doctor. More than 90% of the
general practitioners are listed in the physician directory. As displayed in Figure 4.4
in the appendix, the Arztnavigator polls patients with a standardized questionnaire
about their last physician visit. It allows patients to rate their physician in four
dimensions: appeal of the practice, quality of communication between the patient
and the physician, quality of the treatment, and overall impression. Open comments
are not allowed in order to prevent customers from insulting doctors. The feedback
information from different patients is pooled for each doctor and made available to
other insurees. Insurees can then search for good doctors by weighting the results in
each feedback dimension. Note that the Arztnavigator allows customers to compare
the (perceived) quality provided by an expert. In contrast to the implementation of
public histories in our experiment, the Arztnavigator does not provide any charging
information.
We make use of a 2×2 factorial design varying the reputation mechanism between
private and public histories as well as the pricing regime between flexible and fixed
prices (see Table 4.1). We denote the different settings under which the experiment is
conducted as “conditions” as opposed to the “treatments” performed by the experts.
The two main results of the paper are: first, under fixed prices the level of under-
treatment and the level of overcharging are significantly lower than under flexible
prices. Under flexible prices, we observe a price pressure that undermines reputa-
tion building: experts do not only compete in the two defrauding dimensions under
flexible prices but also in the prices posted. Experts who undertreated in previous
periods try to balance their bad reputation by offering low prices. The lower prices
make it less attractive for the expert to treat sufficiently and to charge honestly.
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Secondly, our results show that the level of overcharging is weak significantly higher
under public than under private histories if prices are flexible while the opposite
holds when prices are fixed. We find the same pattern for the level of undertreat-
ment but differences are not significant. The additional customer information under
public histories intensifies the price competition between experts because experts
who defrauded have to balance their reputation not only towards the customer they
defrauded but towards all customers. Thus, we observe more fraud under public
than under private histories if prices are flexible.
Table 4.1: Conditions.
Reputation mechanism
Private histories Public histories
Price system Fixed PH Fixed PUH Fixed
Flexible PH Flexible PUH Flexible
The seminal papers on reputation argue that reputation helps reduce inefficien-
cies in markets with asymmetric information (Kreps and Wilson, 1982; Milgrom
and Roberts, 1982). Shapiro (1983) as well as Klein and Leﬄer (1981) analyze how
sellers build up reputation when customers are not able to observe the sellers’ prod-
uct quality prior to purchase. They show that there are price-quality equilibria in
which sellers provide high quality at a price above costs. The first contribution on
reputational incentives in credence goods markets is by Wolinsky (1993). Experts
do not overcharge customers in the first period as customers choose to switch to a
different seller in the second period when being charged a major treatment in the
first period. This in turn disciplines experts to charge customers honestly. Our
experimental results in markets with fixed prices undermine Wolinsky’s theoretical
argument. We in fact observe that experts build up a reputation by not charging the
price for the major treatment. In markets with flexible prices, however, competition
drives down the treatment prices. This makes it unprofitable for experts to build
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up reputation by charging the price for the lower treatment. Instead, the low prices
induce a higher overcharging rate.
Ely and Välimäki (2003) and Ely et al. (2008) show that reputation may also lead
to more fraud and less efficient market outcomes if experts cannot be held liable for
their treatments but treatments are observable. Ely and Välimäki (2003) take up
the model by Kreps and Wilson (1982) and consider short-lived customers and two
types of long-lived experts: good experts who aim to keep their reputation of treating
appropriately34 and bad experts who undertreat their customers whenever possible.
Good experts try to separate themselves from bad experts by treating customers
such that for the newly entering customers the observed relation of minor to major
treatments reflects the ex-ante probabilities of having a minor or a major problem.
This implies that good experts may undertreat their short-lived customers if there
are sufficiently many customers with major problems in previous periods. Note
that newly entering customers only observe the type of treatment performed in the
previous periods but not whether a treatment was sufficient. In contrast, our long-
lived customers do not observe the treatment itself but can verify the treatment’s
outcome, i. e., customers notice when they are undertreated. Whereas customers in
Ely and Välimäki (2003) and Ely et al. (2008) base their strategy on the observed
relation of minor to major treatments, customers in our set-up can condition their
strategy on whether an expert has undertreated before.
Dulleck et al. (2012) implement a credence goods experiment with fixed prices.
The authors are interested in the question of whether good experts who always
treat sufficiently post high prices or high prices induce a sufficient treatment. They
show that in a market without reputational concerns, good experts signal their type
using the price but high prices do not induce sufficient treatment. In their setting,
endogenous prices lead to a more efficient market result. We show that if customers
can at least identify the expert they are trading with, i. e., experts can build up a
reputation by not undertreating or by charging the price for the minor treatment,
34A treatment is appropriate if the type of treatment matches the type of problem, i. e., the expert
neither under- nor overtreats.
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fixed prices lead to a more efficient market outcome than flexible prices. The reason
for the difference in results is that experts compete in an additional dimension in our
markets: while in Dulleck et al. (2012) price is the only signal customers can base
their beliefs about the experts’ treatment behavior on, the reputation mechanisms
we implement allow customers to track at least the history of own undertreatments
and prices charged. As a consequence, prices become less important as a signaling
instrument for sufficient treatment. Instead, experts who undertreated in previous
periods balance their bad reputation by posting lower prices.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides
the market description. In section 4.3, we present the experimental set-up including
the parameterization. In section 4.4, we identify market equilibria for the given
parameterization. Section 4.5 derives predictions. In section 4.6, we present the
results. The last section concludes.
4.2 Market
Our model builds upon Dulleck et al. (2011). There are four experts and four
customers in the market. We assume that each of the customers either suffers from
a minor or a major problem. Each customer knows that she has a problem but does
not know which type of problem she suffers from. A customer’s ex-ante probability
of suffering from a major problem is h, the probability of suffering from a minor
problem 1 − h. These ex-ante probabilities are common knowledge. An expert is
able to identify the problem by performing a costless diagnosis.35 Treating the minor
problem costs an expert cL whereas treating the major problem costs an expert cH
(with cH > cL). The treatment for the major problem tH heals both types of
problems. The treatment for the minor problem tL only heals the minor problem.
Experts are not liable, i. e., they may treat a customer with a major problem with
a minor treatment. The customer cannot observe the treatment but she can verify
35We assume zero diagnosis costs in order to make our results comparable to those in Dulleck et al.
(2011).
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the treatment’s outcome, i. e., the customer notices whether the expert undertreated
her.36 Observing undertreatment is feasible because the customer notices whether
her problem has been fixed or not (Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006, p. 11). The
prices for the treatments are denoted by pL and pH , respectively.
The stage game depends on the experimental condition. In the following, we
outline the stage game for a market with flexible and a market with fixed prices.
In both cases, we discriminate between private and public histories by denoting the
respective step by ′ and ′′. The stage game is played repeatedly for n periods for
each condition. The stage game for a market with flexible prices is as follows:
1. For each of the customers, nature independently draws the type of problem the
customer faces. With probability h a customer suffers from a major problem,
with probability 1− h she suffers from a minor problem.
2. Each expert posts a price menu {pL, pH} for the minor and major treatment.
3.’ Each customer observes each expert’s price menu posted in the current period
and her private history37 as specified below.
3.” Each customer observes each expert’s price menu posted in the current period
and the public histories as specified below.
4. Each customer chooses an expert or decides not to interact.
5. Each expert observes the type of problem for each customer that chose to
interact with him in step 3. Each expert either performs a minor treatment
tL or a major treatment tH for each of his customer(s).
6. Each expert charges each of his customer(s) the price pL or the price pH .
36Remember that undertreatment refers to a situation where the customer has a major problem
but obtains a minor treatment.
37Note that a rational customer builds up her private history in the course of the game and is
always aware of her history. Participants in the experiment, however, might forget parts of
their history. Therefore, we display the private history in step three of the stage game as a
reminder.
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7. Each expert observes his payoff and each customer observes her payoff from
the current period.
The stage game under fixed prices only differs from the above stage game by not
allowing experts to post prices in step two. Instead, the exogenously given prices
are common knowledge among the players before the first stage game starts.
The expert’s payoff per period and customer pie is determined by the price pi he
charges less the costs cj for the treatment tj he applies (i, j ∈ {L,H}) where i and
j do not have to coincide.
pie =pi − cj i, j ∈ {L,H} (4.1)
If no customer decides to interact with the expert, the expert’s payoff amounts to
σ. If the customer decides to interact and is not undertreated, the customer derives
a utility of v. If she decides to interact and is undertreated, she derives a utility of
zero. In either case, the customer has to pay the price for the treatment charged by
the expert. The customer’s per-period payoff pic therefore amounts to
pic =
v − pi if not undertreated, i ∈ {L,H}−pi if undertreated, i ∈ {L,H} (4.2)
if the customer decides to interact. If the customer decides not to enter the market,
her payoff amounts to σ.
The information customers observe in step three of the above stage game depends
upon the experimental condition:38
Private Histories
Under private histories, each customer observes for each of the previous periods
the expert she interacted with, the prices posted by this expert, whether this ex-
38Note that the categories of information that customers observe are the same as in Dulleck et al.
(2011).
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pert charged the price for the minor or the major treatment, whether this expert
undertreated her, and her profit.
Public Histories
Under public histories, each customer observes for each of the previous periods and
each of the customers, the expert the customer interacted with, the prices posted
by this expert, whether this expert charged the price for the minor or the major
treatment, whether this expert the customer interacted with undertreated her, and
what the customer’s profit was.
4.3 Experiment
4.3.1 Design
We apply a 2×2 factorial design. In all four conditions, the parameters are fixed and
are the same as in the experiment by Dulleck et al. (2011): the ex-ante probability
of a customer having a major problem is h = 0.5. The expert’s costs for providing
a minor treatment are cL = 2 and cH = 6 for a major treatment. The customer
derives a utility of v = 10 if her problem is solved. Otherwise, the customer’s utility
amounts to v = 0. In case no interaction takes place, customers and experts receive
a payoff of σ = 1.6 (outside option).
The stage game is repeated for 16 periods. In all conditions, we use matching
groups of eight players. The assignment of the eight players to a matching group
does not change throughout the experiment. Four of the players take the role of a
customer. The remaining four take the role of an expert. The roles are randomly
assigned at the beginning of the experiment and do not change throughout the 16
periods. Across conditions, we vary the reputation mechanism between private and
public histories and the pricing regime between fixed and flexible prices.
In the flexible-price conditions, experts announce prices {{pL, pH} ∈ N2|1 ≤
pL, pH ≤ 11, pL ≤ pH} in step two of the stage game. In the fixed-price condi-
tions, we set the exogenously given prices {pL, pH} = {4, 8} in periods 1–9, and
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{pL, pH} = {0, 3} in periods 10–16. In periods 1–9, there is no obvious way to
choose the fixed prices. We use the price vector of {pL, pH} = {4, 8} for three rea-
sons: firstly, equal mark-up prices are observed in several credence goods markets
with price regulation. An example is the remuneration of short counseling interviews
at general practitioners in Germany. Although the content of the counseling inter-
views and thus the service usually varies widely, the remuneration for the physician
is always the same. Assuming that the general practitioner has similar costs for a
short counseling independent of the content, he faces equal mark-ups for different
services. Another example is the market for taxi rides. Once the passenger has paid
the flat fee for taking a taxi, the taxi driver earns the same mark-up for each addi-
tional kilometer he transports the passenger (assuming that traffic is similar). The
second reason we implement the price vector {4, 8} is that the two equal mark-up
vectors {4, 8} and {3, 7} are the most frequently posted price vectors under flexible
prices in our experiment. Thus, by choosing one of the two equal mark-up vectors,
we approximate the expert pricing behavior observed under flexible prices. Among
the two most often posted price vectors, we thirdly choose to implement the vector
{4, 8} as this is one of the vectors used in the related study by Dulleck et al. (2012)
that we will compare our results to.39
In periods 10–16, the price for the major treatment pH = 3 is derived from the
predicted expert pricing behavior.40 The level of pH ensures that customers still
interact although they expect to be undertreated and overcharged in equilibrium.
Theory does not provide a prediction for the price pL as it is never charged in
equilibrium. As we implement equal mark-up prices in the first nine periods, we
approximate the equal mark-up price by setting pL to the minimum of pL = 0 in
39Under flexible prices, theory predicts that experts post a price pH that is below marginal costs
for the major treatment. Thus, experts make losses if they do not undertreat a customer with
a major problem. Inducing expert losses exogenously by setting a price that is below costs for
the major treatment may increase experts’ undertreatment compared to a situation where the
price choice is endogenous. Thus, we fix the price above the costs for a major treatment.
40Note that a price below marginal costs does not alter the experts’ incentive to provide a sufficient
treatment in the last periods because experts undertreat independent of the price vector posted.
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periods 10–16. Note that experts under flexible prices also posted a price for the
minor treatment in periods 10–16 that was on average slightly below costs.
4.3.2 Procedure
The experimental sessions were conducted in the Cologne Laboratory for Economic
Research between March and November 2012. 256 participants took part in the
experiment. Participants were equally allocated to the four conditions so that in
each condition there were 64 participants. Hence, there were eight matching groups
(markets) per condition. We used ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) to recruit participants.
We ran the experiments using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). None of the participants
took part in more than one session. The instructions were read aloud at the begin-
ning of each session. A detailed set of control questions followed the instructions in
order to ensure that all participants understood the experiment. After the experi-
ment, players’ social preferences were determined by the choice of payoff pairs for
oneself and a randomly assigned other person. Additionally, we used a questionnaire
to control for gender and age. The average time each session lasted was two hours.
Participants earned on average 20.07 Euro.
4.4 Equilibria of the Model
In the following, we look for perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game described in
section 4.2.41 Two classes of equilibria might emerge: no-reputation equilibria and
reputation equilibria (see Dulleck et al., 2011). The no-reputation equilibria are the
one-shot Bayesian equilibria that are played repeatedly over all 16 periods while
the reputation equilibria are based on the players’ repeated interaction. In what
follows, we will characterize both classes of equilibria for the flexible- and fixed-
price conditions.
41Note that the outlined equilibria are not exhaustive. There exist, for example, also equilibria
with asymmetric expert behavior as pointed out by Dulleck et al. (2011). In line with their
analysis, we restrict our analysis to equilibria with symmetric expert behavior.
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4.4.1 Flexible Prices
The equilibria under flexible prices are adapted and generalized from Dulleck et al.
(2011). We do not distinguish between private and public histories because for both
classes, there is no difference in the classes between the two types of histories.
Lemma 4.1. No-reputation equilibria
In a market with flexible prices, there exist equilibria with the following character-
istics: all experts post a price menu {n.d., 3}42 with probability x = 0.84398 and an
unattractive price menu {n.d., pH} where pH > 3 with probability 1−x. If an expert
posts {n.d., 3}, the expert undertreats customers facing a major problem and always
overcharges his customers. If no expert posts {n.d., 3}, there is no interaction.
Proof. See Dulleck et al. (2011).
In a market with flexible prices, there exist the above described no-reputation
equilibria in which experts strongly compete in the price dimension. The competitive
price pH = 3 for the major treatment is so low that experts would even make losses
in expectation if they always overcharged but did not undertreat customers with a
major problem. Thus, it does not pay for experts to build up reputation. Hence,
experts always undertreat customers with a major problem and always overcharge.
Experts are indifferent between posting a competitive price vector {n.d., 3} with
probability x = 0.84398 and posting an unattractive price vector where pH > 3 with
probability 1−x. The reason experts play mixed strategies is that in case an expert
only serves one customer, his profit amounts to 1 while the outside option yields a
payoff of 1.6. Thus, it only pays for the expert to offer the competitive price if he
can expect more than one customer on average.
We next turn to the class of reputation equilibria which is characterized as follows:
Lemma 4.2. Reputation equilibria
In a market with flexible prices, there exist equilibria with the following character-
istics: each expert posts a price menu {n.d, 5} in the first nine periods and a price
42n. d. denotes ’not determined’.
Reputation in Credence Goods Markets 87
menu {n.d., 3} afterwards. Experts always overcharge customers with a minor prob-
lem. Experts do not undertreat customers facing a major problem in the first nine
periods with sufficiently high probability. Experts undertreat customers with a major
problem in periods 10–16 and overcharge all customers.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.1.
In contrast to the no-reputation equilibrium, the reputation equilibrium implies
that experts post higher prices in the first periods allowing them to build up a rep-
utation by not undertreating without making losses. A customer observes her own
history (under private histories) respectively all customers’ histories (under public
histories) regarding undertreatment and prices charged. The customer conditions
her choice of expert on whether she respectively any of the four customers has been
undertreated by the expert in previous periods. In periods 10–16, experts under-
treat customers with a major problem because the additional current payoff from
undertreating is larger than the forgone profit when losing the customers in the last
periods. Experts always overcharge customers with a minor problem in equilibrium.
In periods 10–16, experts also overcharge the customers facing a major problem.
Customers still interact in periods 10–16 because the price for the major treatment
is sufficiently low. Thus, the expected payoff from interacting exceeds the outside
option.
The reasoning why experts only build up reputation in the treatment but not
the charging dimension under flexible prices is as follows: customers cannot observe
whether an expert overcharged. Thus, customers’ strategy can only condition on
whether the price for the minor or the major treatment was charged. If an expert
tried to build up reputation of not overcharging by always charging the price for the
minor treatment (with pL < pH = 5) in the first periods, his payoff would be lower
than the outside option. In later periods, the expert who built up reputation by
charging the price for the minor treatment would have to return to charging the price
for the major treatment in order to make positive profits. Due to price competition,
the competitors would slightly undercut the higher price in later periods though and
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still offer a sufficient treatment. Hence, the competitors would attract all customers.
Thus, charging pL in the first periods is not profitable under flexible prices.
4.4.2 Fixed Prices
In contrast to flexible prices, the experts’ action space reduces to the treatment
and charging choice if prices are fixed. In the following, we present the classes of
equilibria that have a similar structure as the equilibria in a market with flexible
prices. Under fixed prices, there exist no-reputation equilibria with the following
properties:
Lemma 4.3. No-reputation equilibria
In a market with fixed prices, there exist equilibria in which there is no interaction in
periods 1–9. In periods 10–16, experts always overcharge customers and undertreat
those customers with a major problem.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.2.
In contrast to the no-reputation equilibria under flexible prices, prices are not
low enough for customers to interact in periods 1–9. Their outside option of 1.6
is larger than the expected payoff of interacting which amounts to −3 given that
experts always overcharge and undertreat customers with a major problem. Thus,
customers do not interact in the first nine periods. In the last periods, prices in the
fixed price set-up are low enough so that although experts always overcharge and
always undertreat customers with a major problem, customers interact.
With prices given by {pL, pH} = {4, 8} in periods 1–9 and by {pL, pH} = {0, 3}
in periods 10–16, customers would not interact in the first nine periods if they
randomized between experts. If interaction is still observed, customers must hence
coordinate on experts. The class of reputation equilibria in a market with fixed
prices is characterized by:
Lemma 4.4. Reputation equilibria
In a market with fixed prices, there exist equilibria in which experts do not undertreat
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customers with a major problem in periods 1–9 but always overcharge customers
with a minor problem. In periods 10–16, experts always overcharge and undertreat
customers with a major problem.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.3.
The reputation equilibria outlined above are characterized by experts building
up a reputation by not undertreating in periods 1–9. Experts always undertreat in
periods 10–16. Experts overcharge customers with a minor problem in all periods.
The equilibria described in Lemma 4.4 hold for both information structures: private
and public histories.
Under public histories, there exists an additional reputation equilibrium in which
experts build up reputation in the first periods by not undertreating and always
charging pL in periods 1–7. The expert serving the customers makes zero profits in
the first periods. In periods 8 and 9, the expert makes positive profits by charging
the customers the major treatment and not undertreating. In periods 10–16, ex-
perts always overcharge customers and undertreat those customers facing a major
problem.43 The equilibrium is characterized as follows:
Lemma 4.5. Reputation equilibrium without overcharging
In a market with fixed prices and public histories, there exists an equilibrium in
which experts do not undertreat in periods 1–9. In periods 10–16, experts always
undertreat customers with a major problem. In periods 1–7, experts charge pL; in
periods 8–16, experts always overcharge customers with a minor problem.
Proof. See Appendix 4.8.4.
If the expert serving customers deviated in periods 1–7 by undertreating a cus-
tomer, by charging a customer pH , or both, all customers would observe the de-
viation. Consequently, all customers would visit a different expert. This in turn
43As outlined before, a reputation equilibrium without overcharging does not exist under flexi-
ble prices. This is because competitors would slightly undercut the price of the expert not
overcharging in periods 8 and 9.
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disciplines the experts not to deviate. Note that the punishment mechanism for
charging pH only works under public but not under private histories. If a customer
under private histories observed that he was charged pH , visiting a different expert
would not be a credible threat because being the only customer at the other expert
would mean that she would be undertreated and overcharged, yielding a payoff of
−3.44 If the customer did not interact after the deviation instead of switching to a
different expert, her payoff amounted to 1.6 while staying with the expert charging
pH yields a payoff of 2. Thus, customers charged pH would still visit the same expert
after being charged pH . Thus, the deviation is profitable for experts under private
histories.
4.5 Predictions
In the following, we derive predictions for the differences in the level of undertreat-
ment and the level of overcharging between the four conditions. We also shortly
describe experts’ price posting behavior.
4.5.1 Level of Undertreatment
The first hypothesis is concerned with the difference between the flexible- and fixed-
price conditions. There is no trade in the first nine periods under fixed prices if
players coordinate on the no-reputation equilibrium. Thus, if we observe interac-
tion, theory predicts that experts and customers behave according to the reputation
equilibrium. Then, none of the customers is undertreated in periods 1–9. Under
flexible prices and observed trade, however, players might either coordinate on the
reputation equilibrium or the no-reputation equilibrium. Hence, undertreatment is
possible in periods 1–9. Independent of which equilibrium players coordinate on un-
der flexible prices, the equilibrium price for the major treatment in the flexible-price
44Remember that under private histories customers do not observe how many customers an expert
had in the previous period.
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condition is lower than the exogenously set price in the fixed-price conditions. Thus,
we can state the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.1 (Fixed vs. flexible prices: undertreatment). If interaction between
experts and customers is observed in periods 1–9, the level of undertreatment in
periods 1–9 is equal or lower under fixed than under flexible prices. The price pH
experts post under flexible prices is lower than the exogenously set price pH in the
fixed-price conditions.
Next, we turn to the difference in the level of undertreatment if prices are flexible
and histories are either private or public. Whether the level of undertreatment is
lower or higher under private than under public histories depends on whether experts
and customers coordinate on the no-reputation or reputation equilibrium. Thus,
theory does not provide a prediction about the treatment comparison. The intuition
why we expect less undertreatment under public than under private histories is that
each customer observes the sufficiency of all treatments provided and not only the
sufficiency of the her own treatment. Hence, the customer has the possibility to
condition the choice of expert on whether any of the customers has been undertreated
by the expert in any of the previous periods under public histories. Therefore, expert
punishment and the customers’ search for an expert not undertreating is facilitated.
Prices, however, do not differ between the two reputation mechanisms. Thus, we
can derive the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.2 (Private vs. public histories under flexible prices: undertreat-
ment). If players play a reputation equilibrium in a market with flexible prices, we
expect the level of undertreatment in periods 1–9 to be equal or lower for public than
for private histories. The price pH posted by experts does not differ between the
conditions.
The above outlined reasoning for why we expect less fraud under public than under
private histories also applies to a market with fixed prices. We still distinguish in
the hypotheses for the difference between private and public histories with respect
to the price regime because results differ across price regimes as shown below.
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Hypothesis 4.3 (Private vs. public histories under fixed prices: undertreatment).
If experts and customers play the reputation equilibrium outlined in Lemma 4.4 or
in Lemma 4.5 in a market with fixed prices, we expect the level of undertreatment
in periods 1–9 to be equal or lower for public than for private histories.
4.5.2 Level of Overcharging
Next, we turn to the hypotheses concerning overcharging. Under flexible prices, cus-
tomers are always overcharged. If experts charged pL instead of pH in the first peri-
ods, experts would have lower payoffs in expectation than if not interacting. Thus,
charging pL might only be rational if higher prices in later periods compensated the
forgone profit in the first periods. Due to price competition, the competitors would
undercut the higher price in later periods though and still offer a sufficient treatment.
Thus, charging pL in the first periods is not profitable under flexible prices. Under
fixed prices and public histories, however, there exists a reputation equilibrium in
which customers are not overcharged in the first seven periods. Therefore, we state
the following hypothesis with respect to the expected difference in overcharging in
the two price regimes:
Hypothesis 4.4 (Fixed vs. flexible prices: overcharging). If interaction between
experts and customers is observed in periods 1–9, the level of overcharging in peri-
ods 1–9 is equal or lower in a market with fixed prices than in a market with flexible
prices.
Under flexible prices, experts cannot build up reputation by treating sufficiently
and charging pL. This insight holds independent of the information structure in
the market. The reason is that experts’ possibility to undercut competitors’ prices
is sufficient for the non-existence of no-overcharging equilibria in the markets we
consider. Thus, we expect no difference in the level of overcharging between public
and private histories:
Hypothesis 4.5 (Private vs. public histories under flexible prices: overcharging).
If interaction between experts and customers is observed in periods 1–9, the level of
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overcharging in periods 1–9 does not differ between public and private histories in a
market with flexible prices.
In a market with fixed prices and public histories, experts can build up reputation
with respect to the sufficiency of a treatment and the charging decision. The equilib-
rium outlined in Lemma 4.5 shows that experts charge customers pL in periods 1–7.
Customers can credibly threaten experts to switch to a different expert if the expert
undertreats or charges pH . This is because all customers observe an expert’s devi-
ation. Losing all customers induces a sufficiently high reduction in expert profits
such that experts will not charge pH in the first periods. Under private histories,
however, customers cannot credibly threaten to switch to a different expert because
other customers would not observe the deviation and thus would not punish the
expert.45 Visiting an expert who only serves one customer is not rational for the
customer as she would be undertreated. Thus, visiting a different expert is not a
credible threat. Hence, we can state the following prediction with respect to the
difference between private and public histories under fixed prices:
Hypothesis 4.6 (Private vs. public histories under fixed prices: overcharging).
If interaction between experts and customers is observed in periods 1–9, the level
of overcharging in periods 1–9 is equal or lower under public than under private
histories in a market with fixed prices.
4.6 Results
This section provides an overview and a discussion of the methods used before
presenting the experimental results for the level of undertreatment and the level
of overcharging. We also shortly comment on the prices posted and charged. We
restrict our analysis to the first nine periods where reputational concerns may play
a role.
45Note that under private histories, customers cannot observe how many other customers visit an
expert.
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All non-parametric test results reported in the following are based on two-tailed
Mann Whitney U Tests. Test results are reported to be (weakly) significant if the
two-tailed test’s p-value is smaller than 0.05 (0.1). We consider the average per mar-
ket over individuals and over the first nine periods as one independent observation.
Thus, our non-parametric test results are based on eight independent observations
per condition.
In order to separate the mechanisms at work and to account for individual hetero-
geneity, we complement the non-parametric test results by parametric tests in form
of regressions. The data structure, however, is challenging for regression analysis
as several factors combine: firstly, the stage game is repeated for 16 periods which
imposes a serial correlation between the observations per individual over time. Sec-
ondly, eight individuals interact within a market which potentially leads to correlated
observations within the market. And thirdly, our dependent variables—whether a
customer was undertreated respectively overcharged in a period—are binary.
We follow Dulleck et al. (2011) and make use of the random effects panel probit
regression with standard errors clustered on the individual level. The panel probit
model accounts for the fact that the stage game is repeated for 16 periods and
that the dependent variable is binary. In contrast to the fixed effects estimator, the
random effects estimator allows us to estimate the treatment effect although the
condition does not vary within an individual. Note that current implementations
of binary panel regressions do not allow clustering on a different level than the
individuals’ level nor is it possible to use robust standard errors. Thus, we may not
be capturing the correlation within markets. Introducing market dummies to control
for the different markets is not an option firstly because the dummies introduce high
collinearity and secondly because results would be relative to the reference market.
Therefore, we also present the results of a random effects panel OLS regression
with robust standard errors clustered on the market level (see for the methodology
of robust clustered standard errors Huber, 1967; Rogers, 1993; White, 1980). This
alternative approach has been previously used by Dulleck et al. (2012) in the same
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set-up as ours. In contrast to the implementation of the panel probit regression, the
implementation of the panel OLS regression does explicitly allow to cluster standard
errors on the market level. There are two more advantages of the panel OLS results:
firstly, the panel OLS regression eases the interpretation of coefficients. Secondly,
the interaction term cannot be misleading (see for a methodological discussion on
the interpretation of interaction terms in non-linear response models Ai and Norton,
2003). The drawback of the panel OLS regression is that it does not account for the
binarity of the dependent variable and hence suffers from out-of-bound predictions
and built-in heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2009).
Our main results hold independent of the choice of method. Whenever the panel
OLS estimates deviate from the panel probit estimates, we indicate the deviation in
a footnote.
In order to evaluate the model fit, we report the McKelvey and Zavoina R2M&Z
(McKelvey and Zavoina, 1975) for the binary panel models and the ordinary R2 for
the panel OLS regressions.46 We choose the McKelvey and Zavoina R2M&Z because
it is applicable to binary panel models and mirrors the ordinary R2. It is defined as
R2M&Z = V ar(yˆ
∗)/(V ar(yˆ∗) + V ar()) where yˆ∗ denotes the prediction of the latent
response variable and  denotes the error term. By assumption of the probit model
V ar() = 1. Note that due to this assumption about the variance of the error term,
the ordinary R2 and the McKelvey and Zavoina R2M&Z are not identical.
4.6.1 Level of Undertreatment
The descriptive experimental results for the level of undertreatment are presented
in Table 4.2. As our design exactly builds upon the design of Dulleck et al. (2011),
we present their corresponding results. The additional data allows us to compare
the level of undertreatment under private and public histories with a situation in
which the customer cannot even identify the expert she is interacting with (condition
None), i. e., a market without reputational concerns.
46Note that due to the different estimation technique, we cannot compare probit and OLS models
with the same R2.
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Table 4.2: Percentage of undertreatment in periods 1–9.
Reputation mechanism
This paper Dulleck et al. (2011)
Private Public None Private
histories histories histories
Price system Fixed 31.43% 24.41% – –
Flexible 58.47% 63.46% 61.18% 59.22%
In our regressions on the level of undertreatment, we control for the period in
which an interaction takes place, the conditions and the interaction effect between
the conditions. The basic specification is as follows where ci denotes the random
intercept of individual i and uit denotes the idiosyncratic error term for individual
i in period t:
undertreatmentit = β0 + β1periodit + β2private_historiesit + β3fixed_pricesit
+ β4private_historiesit · fixed_pricesit + ci + uit. (4.3)
Table 4.3 displays our regression results. We report the random effects panel OLS
estimation with robust standard errors clustered on the market level in the last two
columns.
Result 4.1 (Flexible vs. fixed prices: undertreatment). The level of undertreatment
is significantly higher under flexible than under fixed prices. Prices posted by experts
under flexible prices are significantly lower than the exogenously given prices in the
fixed-price condition.
Our experimental results are in line with our first hypothesis: the level of under-
treatment is significantly higher in the flexible- than in the fixed-price regime (see
models (3) and (5) in Table 4.3; Mann Whitney U Test: p < 0.001). According to
the OLS estimates, this difference in the level of undertreatment amounts to 33.3
percentage points. Prices posted by experts under flexible prices are significantly
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Table 4.3: Random effects panel regressions on undertreatment in periods 1–9.
Panel probit Panel OLS
Undertreatment (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Period 0.046∗ 0.047∗ 0.044∗ 0.044∗ 0.015 0.015
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.013) (0.013)
Private histories 0.134 0.068 −0.133 −0.020 −0.043
(0.187) (0.155) (0.216) (0.071) (0.100)
Fixed prices −0.955∗∗∗ −1.161∗∗∗ −0.333∗∗∗ −0.393∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.227) (0.072) (0.114)
Private histories · 0.415 0.125
fixed prices (0.312) (0.141)
Intercept −0.375∗∗ −0.446∗∗ 0.064 0.171 0.531∗∗∗ 0.564∗∗∗
(0.161) (0.190) (0.187) (0.204) (0.093) (0.098)
R2M&Z 0.029 0.033 0.184 0.190 − −
R2 − − − − 0.117 0.120
Observations 454 454 454 454 454 454
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level for panel probit regressions (Note: clustering for
panel probit regressions on a different level than the individuals’ is not implemented). Standard errors
are robust and clustered on the market level for panel OLS regressions. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
lower than the exogenously given prices in the fixed-price condition (Mann Whitney
U Test: p < 0.001 for both treatment prices).47
Players coordinate on the reputation equilibrium under fixed prices. Experts build
up a reputation by treating customers sufficiently in the first periods. The average
rate of undertreatment under fixed prices amounts to 27.59% in the first nine peri-
ods (and even only to 22.97% in the first eight periods). Customers punish experts
who undertreat more often under fixed than under flexible prices by returning sig-
nificantly less often to the undertreating expert (Mann Whitney U Test: p < 0.001).
In later periods, experts exploit their reputation by undertreating. The average rate
of undertreatment rises to 86.70% in periods 10–16 under fixed prices. Figure 4.1
47Note that this difference in the level of undertreatment holds for both types of reputation mech-
anisms: private (Mann Whitney U Test: p = 0.009) and public histories (Mann Whitney U
Test: p = 0.006).
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Figure 4.1: Average rate of undertreatment for each condition.
illustrates the average rate of undertreatment for each of the four conditions over
time.
Under flexible prices, players rather coordinate on the competitive than the rep-
utation equilibrium. The average rate of undertreatment amounts to 60.81% in the
first nine periods. We observe a price pressure that undermines reputation building:
experts do not only compete in the two defrauding dimensions under flexible prices
but also in the prices posted. Figure 4.2 visualizes the decline in the price posted
for the major treatment over time in the two flexible-price conditions. Experts who
undertreated in previous periods try to balance their bad reputation by offering low
prices in the following periods. In fact, we find that the average price posted for
the major treatment prior to an expert’s first undertreatment amounts to 7.30 while
the price significantly declines to 6.04 on average after an expert’s first undertreat-
ment (Mann Whitney U Test: p < 0.001). Concerning the customer behavior under
flexible prices, our results show that customers return significantly more often to an
expert that has undertreated the customer in one of the previous periods under the
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Figure 4.2: Development of prices posted over time in flexible-price conditions.
flexible- compared to the fixed-price conditions (Mann Whitney U Test: p < 0.001).
Thus, the decline in the price posted for the major treatment by an expert who
undertreated seems to be sufficiently large to attract customers in future periods.
Hence, price competition undermines reputation building and thereby leads to a
higher level of undertreatment if prices are flexible.
For both pricing regimes—fixed as well as flexible—experts’ choice of treatment in
periods 10–16 matches the predicted behavior. Following the theoretical predictions,
we would expect experts to always undertreat in the last seven periods. The average
level of undertreatment under flexible prices in periods 10–16 amounts to 77.78%
and under fixed prices—as mentioned above—even to 86.70%.
Note that our results are in contrast to Dulleck et al. (2012): Dulleck et al. (2012)
find in a setting without reputation that flexible prices lead to a more efficient mar-
ket outcome than fixed prices because experts signal their type using a high price
for the major treatment. We find that under reputation, flexible prices increase the
level of undertreatment (see Table 4.2 and 4.3) and decrease market efficiency com-
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Table 4.4: Efficiency in periods 1-9.
Reputation mechanism
Private histories Public histories
Price system Fixed 60.89% 84.88%
Flexible 58.55% 64.95%
Efficiency is calculated as follows: (actual average surplus − outside
option)/(maximum average surplus − outside option).
pared to a market set-up with fixed prices (see Table 4.4; Mann Whitney U Test:
p = 0.036).48 The difference between Dulleck et al. (2012) and our results can be
explained by the additional dimension of competition that experts face in a market
where reputation mechanisms are in place: while in Dulleck et al. (2012) price is the
only signal customers can base their beliefs about the experts’ treatment behavior
on, the reputation mechanisms we implement allow customers to track at least the
history of own undertreatments. Thus, customers can base their decision on which
expert to visit not only on the price but also on the sufficiency of treatments in
previous periods. As a consequence, prices become less important as a signaling
instrument. Instead, experts use the price to balance their reputation once they un-
dertreated. Hence, the additional dimension of expert competition changes experts’
pricing and defrauding behavior.
Result 4.2 (Private vs. public histories under flexible prices: undertreatment). The
level of undertreatment is non-significantly higher under public than under private
histories if prices are flexible. Prices are non-significantly lower under public than
under private histories if prices are flexible.
In contrast to Hypothesis 4.2, we find that more customer information does not
lead to a decrease in the expert’s incentive to undertreat his customer if prices are
48Note that the efficiency result is driven by the difference in the public history conditions (Mann
Whitney U Test: p = 0.010). In the private history conditions, the difference between fixed
and flexible prices is not statistically significant (Mann Whitney U Test: p = 0.563). The
lower efficiency level under private histories with fixed prices is due to a low rate of interaction.
Several customers in this condition decided not to interact for almost all 16 periods.
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Figure 4.3: Development of prices paid over time in flexible-price conditions.
flexible. The descriptives even suggest that more customer information might lead
to a higher level of undertreatment in periods 1–9. However, this difference is not
statistically significant (see models (4) and (6) in Table 4.3; Mann Whitney U Test:
p = 0.916). The higher undertreatment rate under public histories comes along
with a lower average price paid by the customer in the public (5.15) compared to
the private histories (5.38) condition. Figure 4.3 illustrates the average price paid
by customers over time and shows that for all except for two periods, the average
price paid is lower under public than under private histories.
Price competition under public histories is more intense than under private his-
tories as customers observe all customers’ histories. Once an expert undertreated a
customer in any of the previous periods, the expert has to balance his bad reputation
not only towards the customer undertreated but towards all customers. Compar-
ing our results to Dulleck et al. (2011) shows that private histories slightly reduce
experts’ undertreatment compared to a market where no reputation building is pos-
sible. In contrast, the public history mechanism induces a slightly higher level of
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Table 4.5: Percentage of overcharging in periods 1–9.
Reputation mechanism
Private histories Public histories
Price system Fixed 71.11% 41.24%
Flexible 77.84% 86.54%
undertreatment. These results provide further evidence for the hypothesis that more
customer information does not necessarily decrease the level of undertreatment (see
Table 4.2).
Result 4.3 (Private vs. public histories under fixed prices: undertreatment). The
level of undertreatment is non-significantly lower under public than under private
histories if prices are fixed.
In contrast to the flexible price treatments, the level of undertreatment is lower
under public than under private histories if prices are fixed. This difference is not
statistically significant (Mann Whitney U Test: p = 0.103). Given that the level of
undertreatment is already low under private histories, it comes as no surprise that
the additional customer information does not lead to a significant decrease in the
rate of undertreatment. The additional customer information about whether other
customers receive a sufficient treatment does, however, significantly increase the rate
of interaction (Mann Whitney U Test: p = 0.042). While under private histories,
customers interact in 73.26% of the cases, the rate of interaction amounts to 96.18%
in the public histories condition.
4.6.2 Level of Overcharging
In the following, we present the results concerning the level of overcharging. Ta-
ble 4.5 provides an overview of the level of overcharging across conditions.
In order to disentangle the different drivers for the expert’s incentive to overcharge
and to control for individual heterogeneity, we again perform a random effects panel
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Table 4.6: Random effects panel regressions on overcharging in periods 1–9.
Panel probit Panel OLS
Overcharging (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Period 0.043∗ 0.042∗ 0.041∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.011 0.012
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008)
Private histories 0.301 0.240 −0.425∗∗ 0.094 −0.086
(0.191) (0.162) (0.213) (0.073) (0.060)
Fixed prices −0.882∗∗∗ −1.492∗∗∗ −0.259∗∗∗ −0.440∗∗∗
(0.163) (0.213) (0.078) (0.116)
Private histories · 1.324∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗
fixed prices (0.305) (0.137)
Intercept 0.486∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗ 1.045∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.808∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.170) (0.176) (0.186) (0.068) (0.063)
R2M&Z 0.022 0.035 0.151 0.211 − −
R2 − − − − 0.104 0.149
Observations 705 705 705 705 705 705
Standard errors are clustered on the individual level for panel probit regressions (Note: clustering for
panel probit regressions on a different level than the individuals’ is not implemented). Standard errors
are robust and clustered on the market level for panel OLS regressions. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses. ∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01. p-values are based on two-tailed tests.
probit regression with standard errors clustered on the individual level and a random
effects panel OLS regression with robust standard errors clustered on the market
level. Besides the conditions, we control for the period in which an interaction takes
place. We also add the interaction effect of the conditions. Thus, the specification
is as follows where ci denotes the random intercept of individual i and uit denotes
the idiosyncratic error term for individual i in period t:
overchargingit = β0 + β1periodit + β2private_historiesit + β3fixed_pricesit
+ β4private_historiesit · fixed_pricesit + ci + uit. (4.4)
Table 4.6 displays our regression results.
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Result 4.4 (Flexible vs. fixed prices: overcharging). The level of overcharging is
significantly lower under fixed than under flexible prices.
In line with Hypothesis 4.4, overcharging is significantly lower under fixed than
under flexible prices (see models (3) and (5) in Table 4.6; Mann Whitney U Test:
p = 0.019).49 Following the OLS estimates, this difference in the probability of being
overcharged amounts to 25.9 percentage points. If prices are flexible, competition
drives down prices (see Figure 4.2 and 4.3). A possible explanation why experts
overcharge more often if prices are flexible may be that experts try to compen-
sate the losses due to the lower prices. Thus, price competition again undermines
the reputation mechanism under flexible prices. The fact that customers return
significantly more often to an expert who overcharged in the flexible- than in the
fixed-price condition supports this argument (Mann-Whitney U Test: p < 0.001).50
Result 4.5 (Private vs. public histories under flexible prices: overcharging). The
level of overcharging is weak significantly higher under public than under private
histories if prices are flexible.
We find weak evidence that the level of overcharging is higher under public than
under private histories if prices are flexible (Mann Whitney U Test: p = 0.093).51
Price competition is stronger under public than under private histories because a
customer observes the price each customer was charged in the previous periods and
not only the price she was charged herself. Compensating the lower prices by higher
frequencies of overcharging thus leads to an increased level of overcharging under
public histories.
49Note that the difference in the level of overcharging between flexible and fixed prices is driven by
the difference between the public history conditions (Mann Whitney U Test: p = 0.006). The
difference between the private history conditions is not statistically significant (Mann Whitney
U Test: p = 0.834).
50Note, however, that the customer does not directly observe the overcharging but only the relation
of the prices charged. She can thereby form beliefs about an expert’s overcharging behavior.
51Note that the panel probit regression supports this result on a 5% significance level whereas the
panel OLS regression does not find a statistically significant difference.
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Result 4.6 (Private vs. public histories under fixed prices: overcharging). The level
of overcharging is weak significantly lower under public than under private histories
if prices are fixed.
This result on overcharging again follows the pattern we find for the level of
undertreatment: in a fixed-price regime, there is less overcharging under public than
under private histories. Looking at the descriptives in Table 4.5, this difference in the
level of overcharging amounts to about 30 percentage points. According to the Mann
Whitney U Test, however, the difference is only weakly significant (p = 0.066). The
reason is that six out of the eight markets under private histories are characterized
by high overcharging levels while the remaining two exhibit a relatively low level of
overcharging.
The difference in the level of overcharging between public and private histories is
due to the fact that customers can observe whether other experts charged the price
for the minor or the major treatment in previous periods under public histories.
Thus, experts have an incentive to keep up their reputation as an honestly charging
expert in the first periods. Note that we virtually find no undercharging under
public histories which is in strong contrast to the predicted expert behavior in the
reputation equilibrium without overcharging (see Lemma 4.5).
4.7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of two reputation mechanisms under fixed prices
and price competition on an expert’s incentive to defraud. We make use of a 2× 2
factorial design to test our predictions experimentally. The two main results of
the paper are: firstly, under fixed prices, the level of undertreatment and the level
of overcharging are considerably lower than under flexible prices. Under flexible
prices, we observe a price pressure that undermines reputation building: experts
who undertreated in previous periods try to balance their bad reputation by offering
low prices. The lower prices in turn make it less attractive for the expert to treat
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sufficiently and to charge honestly. Secondly, we find weak evidence that the level of
overcharging is higher under public than under private histories if prices are flexible
while the opposite holds when prices are fixed. We find the same pattern for the level
of undertreatment when comparing public with private histories but differences are
not statistically significant. The additional customer information intensifies the price
competition between experts because experts who defrauded have to balance their
reputation not only towards the customer they defrauded but towards all customers.
Hence, we observe more fraud under public than under private histories if prices are
flexible.
Our results thus provide first indicative evidence that reputation building might
increase the level of fraud in a market with asymmetric information. This result is
in line with Ely and Välimäki (2003) and Ely et al. (2008). However, the mechanism
at work differs: it is the expert’s attempt to reach a history of treatments reflecting
the ex-ante probabilities that may induce additional undertreatment in their set-up.
In contrast, our results are driven by the intense price competition.52
The implications of our results are twofold as the introduction of public histories
does not necessarily decrease the level of fraud but may even lead to an increase. In
a market with fixed prices, feedback platforms such as the Arztnavigator seem to be
an appropriate instrument to reduce the fraud level. In markets with flexible prices,
however, more customer information may lead to adverse effects with respect to the
fraud level.
In future research, it firstly remains to show how robust the increase in the level
of fraud is when varying between private and public histories under flexible prices.
Secondly, the robustness of our results against changes in the exogenously given price
structure remains to be investigated. Dulleck et al. (2012) provide some evidence
that the level of undertreatment is fairly robust to the price structure in a market
without reputational concerns.
52Whereas we assume that customers cannot observe the treatment, Ely and Välimäki (2003) and
Ely et al. (2008) assume the opposite. This enables the expert to build up a reputation based
on his treatment history.
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4.8 Appendix A: Proofs
In the following proofs, we assume that if customers are indifferent between visit-
ing and not visiting an expert, the customer opts for the visit. Experts who are
indifferent between undertreating and not undertreating do not undertreat.
For each class of equilibria (no-reputation and reputation equilibria) two types of
equilibria may exist: an equilibrium where customers randomize with equal proba-
bility among experts and an equilibrium where customers coordinate on an expert
in the first period. We outline both types of equilibria in the following if they exist.
4.8.1 Proof of Lemma 4.2
4.8.1.1 Reputation Equilibria in which Customers Randomize
We first comment on the reputation equilibria in which customers randomize be-
tween experts in the first period.
Public Histories The strategies and beliefs as well as the corresponding proof
for the reputation equilibrium under public histories in which customers randomize
are outlined in Dulleck et al. (2011). Note that the strategies and beliefs presented
below partially build upon this equilibrium.
Private Histories Under private histories a reputation equilibrium where cus-
tomers randomize between experts does not exist. This is because customers cannot
coordinate on the expert with the strict majority of customers because customers
do not observe how many customers an expert serves. Without customers observ-
ing which expert serves the most customers and without customer coordination, it
is optimal for experts to undertreat customers unless they face four customers. If
experts post prices as outlined in Lemma 4.2 and an expert serves three customers,
his maximum additional future payoff from treating customers sufficiently amounts
to 7(3 − 1.6) = 9.8 in period 9 (which is the last period where reputational con-
cerns may play a role), while the maximum additional current payoff from deviating
Reputation in Credence Goods Markets 108
amounts to 3((5− 2)− (5− 6)) = 12. Thus, experts always provide the minor treat-
ment if they serve three or less customers. The expected payoff from interacting
(0.5+)5− 0.5(1− 1/64) · 5 = 0.078125 is lower than the outside option of 1.6 (where
1/64 is the probability that all customers choose the same expert in the first period).
4.8.1.2 Reputation Equilibrium in which Customers Coordinate
In the following, we assume that customers coordinate on one of the experts in the
first period. We refer to the four experts as expert A, B, C, and D.
Public Histories The strategies and beliefs in the reputation equilibrium with
customers coordinating under public histories are as follows.
Customers’ beliefs: Each customer believes that experts always charge pH . Each
customer believes to be treated sufficiently if and only if (i) she is treated under
a price menu {n.d., 5} and the expert has at least two customers, (ii) the expert
has only undertreated a customer in situation where all experts served exactly one
customer, and (iii) the game is in periods 1–9. Otherwise, each customer believes
to get the minor treatment.
Customers’ strategy: Each customer visits among the experts posting a price
menu {n.d., 5} the same expert as all other customers (in the following expert A) in
the first period. In periods 2–9, if expert A did not undertreat any of the customers
in the previous period and expert A posts a price menu a {n.d., 5} in the current
period, customers return to expert A. If expert A undertreated any of the customers
in the previous period or posts a price menu different from {n.d., 5} in the current
period, all customers coordinate to another expert (in the following expert B) among
the experts posting a price menu {n.d., 5}. If there is no expert posting {n.d., 5},
customers randomize between those experts posting {n.d., 3}. If there is no expert
posting {n.d., 3}, customers do not interact. Customers’ strategy when visiting
experts B, C and D is according to the above strategy at expert A. If there is
no expert who never undertreated, customers do not interact. In periods 10–16,
customers choose expert A if he never undertreated in periods 1–9. If expert A
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undertreated in any period 1–9, customers visit expert B if he never undertreated
in any period 1–9; and so forth. If there is no expert who never undertreated,
customers randomize between experts with equal probability in periods 10–16.
Expert Strategy: In the first nine periods, all experts post {n.d., 5}. Each ex-
pert serves his customers sufficiently if he has two or more customers and provides
the minor treatment otherwise. In periods 10–16, all experts post the price menu
{n.d., 3} and always provide the minor treatment if one seller had strictly the most
customers in period 9. Otherwise all experts play the strategy described Lemma 4.1.
Verification:
We now verify that the given strategies and beliefs form a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium. We first show that customers’ strategies are rational. In periods 10–16, if
customers interact, they receive an expected payoff of 0.5(10 − 3) + 0.5(0 − 3) = 2
which is larger than their outside option of 1.6. In periods 1–9, given expert be-
havior, it is optimal to interact as the expected payoff of 10 − 5 = 5 is larger than
the one from not interacting (1.6). If customers return to play the above described
randomization equilibrium, customers’ strategy off-equilibrium is optimal as shown
in the public histories reputation equilibrium with randomization.
In the following, we show that experts’ strategy is rational. In periods 10–16 it
is optimal to always provide the minor treatment because the maximum additional
future payoff of treating sufficiently 6 · 2.4 = 14.4 (in period 10) is lower than the
maximum current payoff from deviating 4((5 − 2) − (5 − 6)) = 16. In period 9,
if the expert serves four customers, the expert’s maximum additional future payoff
of treating customers sufficiently amounts to 7 · 2.4 = 16.8 whereas the maximum
additional current payoff from deviating is 4((5 − 2) − (5 − 6)) = 16. If the expert
serves three customers, his maximum additional future payoff of treating customers
sufficiently also amounts to 7(4 − 1.6) = 16.8 (because the single customer will
visit this expert in periods 10–16) whereas the maximum additional current profit
from deviating is 3((5 − 2) − (5 − 6)) = 12. If an expert serves two customers in
period 9, the maximum current payoff from deviating amounts to 2((5 − 2) − (5 −
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6)) = 8. Whether the expert will serve all four customers in periods 10–16 depends
on whether the expert serves the strict majority of customers in period 9. Given
customers’ strategies, an expert should never serve only two customers. Hence,
Bayes’ rule cannot be applied to calculate the probability with which an expert
expects to be the expert with the strict majority of customers. We assume that the
expert believes to serve the strict majority of customers with probability 1. Given
these beliefs, the expert’s maximum additional future payoff of treating sufficiently
amounts to 16.8 because all customers will choose this expert in periods 10–16. In
periods 1–8, future payoff of treating customers sufficiently is larger so that deviation
incentives are lower. Hence, the expert will treat customers sufficiently if he serves
at least two customers under the above beliefs. In case the expert only serves one
customer, the maximum additional future payoff from treating sufficiently amounts
to 7(1− 1.6) = −2.8 while the maximum current payoff from deviating is 4. Thus,
the expert always provides the minor treatment if he serves a single customer. Given
that all other experts charge the price pH for both treatments in all 16 periods, it is
optimal for the individual expert to also charge pH . Consequently, experts’ strategies
are rational.
Private Histories The strategies and beliefs in the reputation equilibrium with
customers coordinating under private histories are as follows.
Customers’ beliefs: Each customer expects to be charged pH in any of the periods.
Each customer believes to be treated sufficiently if and only if (i) she is treated under
a price menu {n.d., 5} and the expert has four customers, (ii) if the expert has never
undertreated the customer before, and (iii) the game is in periods 1–9. Otherwise,
each customer believes to get the minor treatment.
Customers’ strategy: Each customer visits among the experts that post a price
menu {n.d, 5} the same expert as all other customers (in the following expert A) in
the first period. In periods 2–9, if expert A did not undertreat the customer in the
previous period and posts {n.d, 5}, the customer returns to expert A. If expert A
undertreated the customer in the previous period or posts a price vector different
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from {n.d, 5}, the customer refrains from interacting. In periods 10–16, if expert A
did not undertreat the customer in any period 2–9, the customer stays with expert A.
If expert A undertreated the customer in any period 2–9, the customer randomizes
between the remaining three experts with equal probability in periods 10–16.
Experts’ strategy: Experts post price vectors {n.d., 5} in periods 1–9 and {n.d., 3}
in periods 10–16. Each expert treats his customers sufficiently in periods 1–9 if he
serves all four customers and provides the minor treatment otherwise. In periods 10–
16, experts always provide the minor treatment. Experts always charge pH .
Verification:
We now verify that the given strategies and beliefs form a perfect Bayesian equi-
librium. We first show that customers’ strategies are rational. In periods 10–16, if
customers interact, they receive an expected payoff of 0.5(10 − 3) + 0.5(0 − 3) = 2
which is larger than their outside option of 1.6. In periods 1–9, given expert behav-
ior, i.e., always sufficient treatment, it is optimal to interact as the expected payoff of
10−5 = 5 is larger than the one from not interacting (1.6). If expert A undertreats,
it is optimal for the customer to refrain from interacting because the outside option
of 1.6 is larger than the expected payoff from interacting (0.5(10−5)+0.5(0−5) = 0).
In the following, we show that experts’ strategies are rational. In periods 10–16 it
is optimal to always provide the minor treatment because the maximum additional
future payoff of treating sufficiently 6 · 2.4 = 14.4 (in period 10) is lower than the
maximum current payoff from deviating 4((5 − 2) − (5 − 6)) = 16. In period 9,
if the expert serves four customers, the expert’s maximum additional future payoff
of treating customers sufficiently amounts to 7 · 2.4 = 16.8 whereas the maximum
additional current payoff from deviating is 4((5− 2)− (5− 6)) = 16. In periods 1–8,
future payoff of treating customers sufficiently is larger so that deviation incentives
are lower. If the expert serves three or less customers, his maximum additional
future payoff of treating customers sufficiently amounts to 7(3− 1.6) = 9.8 (in case
he serves three customers) which is less than the maximum additional current profit
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from deviating 3((5 − 2) − (5 − 6)) = 12.53 Thus, it is optimal for the expert to
provide the minor treatment. Given that all other experts charge the price pH for
both treatments in all 16 periods, it is optimal for the individual expert to also
charge pH . Hence, experts’ strategy is rational.
4.8.2 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Both types of equilibria (with customer randomization and customer coordination)
described in Lemma 4.3 are characterized as follows:
Customers’ beliefs : Each customer believes to always receive the minor treatment
and to always be charged pH .
Customers’ strategy : Customers do not interact in periods 1–9. Customers ran-
domize between experts in each period respectively coordinate in any (arbitrary)
way on the experts in periods 10–16.
Experts’ strategy : Experts always provide the minor treatment and always charge
pH .
Verification:
We now verify that the above outlined strategies and beliefs form a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. Customers’ behavior is rational because their expected payoff from
interaction in periods 1–9 amounts to 0.5(10− 8) + 0.5(0− 8) = −3 which is less
than the outside option of 1.6. In periods 10–16, if customers interact, they receive
an expected payoff of 0.5(10− 3) + 0.5(0− 3) = 2 which is larger than their outside
option of 1.6. Given the customers’ behavior, experts’ strategies are optimal because
their payoff from always providing the minor treatment at the price pH is larger than
treating sufficiently. Note that the expert cannot decide not to participate.
53Note that the fourth customer in the market will be undertreated because she ends up as a
single customer at an expert in period 9. As the fourth customer cannot observe whether the
expert serving three customers undertreated his customers, her behavior in periods 10–16 is not
changed by the treatment decision of the expert serving three customers in period 9. Hence,
the fourth customer is irrelevant when determining whether the expert serving three customers
deviates or sticks to the equilibrium strategy.
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4.8.3 Proof of Lemma 4.4
The players’ strategies and beliefs in the reputation equilibria without overcharging
in a market with fixed prices are outlined below. The reputation equilibria require
that customers coordinate on one expert in the first period. Given the strategies and
beliefs of reputation equilibria under flexible prices in which customers randomize,
customers would face a lower payoff than the outside option under fixed prices. Thus,
if interaction is still observed, customers must coordinate on one of the experts. We
refer to the four experts as expert A, B, C, and D.
Public Histories The strategies and beliefs in the reputation equilibrium with
customer coordination under public histories are as follows.
Customers’ beliefs: Each customer expects to be charged pH in any of the periods.
Each customer believes to be treated sufficiently if and only if (i) the expert serves at
least two customers, (ii) the expert only undertreated a customer in situation where
all experts served one customer, and (iii) the game is in periods 1–9. Otherwise,
each customer believe to receive the minor treatment.
Customers’ strategy: Each customer visits the same expert (in the following ex-
pert A) as all other customers in the first period. In periods 2–9, if expert A did
not undertreat any of the customers in the previous period, customers return to
expert A. If expert A undertreated in the previous period, all customers visit ex-
pert B. If expert B did not undertreat any of the customers in the previous period,
customers return to expert B whereas if he undertreated in the previous period, cus-
tomers choose expert C; and so forth. If there is no expert who never undertreated,
customers do not interact. In periods 10–16, customers choose expert A if he never
undertreated. If expert A undertreated in any period 1–9, customers visit expert B
if he never undertreated; and so forth. If there is no expert who never undertreated,
customers randomize between experts with equal probability in periods 10–16.
Experts’ strategy: Each expert treats his customers sufficiently in periods 1–9 if
he serves two or more customers and provides the minor treatment otherwise. In
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periods 10–16, experts always provide the minor treatment. Experts always charge
pH .
Verification:
We now verify that the above described strategies and beliefs form a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. We first show that customers’ strategies are rational. In periods 10–16,
if customers interact, they receive an expected payoff of 0.5(10− 3) + 0.5(0− 3) = 2
which is larger than their outside option of 1.6. In periods 1–9, given expert behavior,
i.e., always sufficient treatment, it is optimal to interact as the expected payoff of
10− 8 = 2 is larger than the one from not interacting (1.6).
In the following, we show that experts’ strategy is rational. In periods 10–16 it
is optimal to always provide the minor treatment because the maximum additional
future payoff of treating sufficiently 6 · 2.4 = 14.4 (in period 10) is lower than the
maximum current payoff from deviating 4((8 − 2) − (8 − 6)) = 16. In period 9,
if an expert serves four customers, the expert’s maximum additional future payoff
of treating customers sufficiently amounts to 7 · 2.4 = 16.8 whereas the maximum
additional current payoff from deviating is 4((8 − 2) − (8 − 6)) = 16. If the expert
serves three customers, his maximum additional future payoff of treating customers
sufficiently also amounts to 7(4− 1.6) = 16.8 (because the single customer will visit
this expert in periods 10–16) whereas the maximum additional current profit from
deviating is 3((8 − 2) − (8 − 6)) = 12. If an expert serves two customers in period
9, the maximum current payoff from deviating amounts to 2((8− 2)− (8− 6)) = 8.
Whether the expert serving two customers in period 9 will serve all four customers in
periods 10–16 depends on whether the expert serves the strict majority of customers
in period 9. Given customers’ strategies, an expert should never serve only two
customers. Hence, Bayes’ rule cannot be applied to calculate the probability with
which an expert expects to be the expert with the strict majority of customers.
We assume that the expert believes to serve the strict majority of customers with
probability 1. Given these beliefs, the expert’s maximum additional future payoff of
treating sufficiently amounts to 16.8 because all customers will choose this expert
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in periods 10–16. In periods 1–8, future payoff of treating customers sufficiently is
larger so that deviation incentives are lower. Hence, the expert will treat customers
sufficiently if he serves at least two customers under the above beliefs. In case
the expert only serves one customer, the maximum additional future payoff from
treating sufficiently amounts to 7(1 − 1.6) = −2.8 while the maximum current
payoff from deviating is 4. Thus, the expert always provides the minor treatment
if he serves a single customer. Given that all other experts charge the price pH
for both treatments in all 16 periods, it is optimal for the individual expert to also
charge pH . Consequently, experts’ strategies are rational.
Private Histories The strategies and beliefs in the reputation equilibrium with
customers coordinating under private histories are as follows.
Customers’ beliefs: Each customer expects to be charged pH in any of the periods.
Each customer believes to be treated sufficiently if and only if (i) the expert has four
customers, (ii) the expert has never undertreated the customer before, and if (iii)
the game is in periods 1–9. Otherwise, each customer expects to receive a minor
treatment.
Customers’ strategy: Each customer visits the same expert as all other customers
(in the following expert A) in the first period. In periods 2–9, if expert A did
not undertreat any of the customers in the previous period, customers return to
expert A. If expert A undertreated in the previous period, customers refrain from
interacting. In periods 10–16, if expert A did not undertreat the customer in any
period 2–9, customers stay with expert A. If expert A undertreated the customer
in any period 2–9, customers randomize between experts with equal probability in
periods 10–16.
Experts’ strategy: Each expert treats his customers sufficiently in periods 1–9 if he
serves all four customers and provides the minor treatment otherwise. In periods 10–
16, experts always provide a minor treatment. Experts always charge pH .
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Verification:
We now verify that the above described strategies and beliefs form a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. We first show that customers’ strategies are rational. In periods 10–16,
if customers interact, they receive an expected payoff of 0.5(10− 3) + 0.5(0− 3) = 2
which is larger than their outside option of 1.6. In periods 1–9, given expert behavior,
it is optimal to interact as the expected payoff of 10− 8 = 2 is larger than the one
from not interacting (1.6).
In the following, we show that experts’ strategy is rational. In periods 10–16 it
is optimal to always provide the minor treatment because the maximum additional
future payoff of treating sufficiently 6 · 2.4 = 14.4 (in period 10) is lower than the
maximum current payoff from deviating 4((8 − 2) − (8 − 6)) = 16. In period 9,
if the expert serves four customers, the expert’s maximum additional future payoff
of treating customers sufficiently amounts to 7 · 2.4 = 16.8 whereas the maximum
additional current payoff from deviating is 4((8− 2)− (8− 6)) = 16. In periods 1–8,
future payoff of treating customers sufficiently is larger so that deviation incentives
are lower. If the experts serves three or less customers, his maximum additional
future payoff of treating customers sufficiently amounts to 9.8 (in case he serves
three customers) which is less than the maximum additional current profit from
deviating 3((8− 2)− (8− 6)) = 12.54 Thus, it is optimal for the expert to provide
the minor treatment. Given that all other experts charge the price pH for both
treatments in all 16 periods, it is optimal for the individual expert to also charge
pH . Hence, experts’ strategy is rational.
4.8.4 Proof of Lemma 4.5
The strategies and beliefs of the players in the reputation equilibrium without over-
charging in a market with fixed prices are outlined below. We refer to the four
experts as expert A, B, C, and D.
54Note that the single customer is again irrelevant for the above analysis.
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Customers’ beliefs: Each customer believes to be charged pL if (i) the expert serves
at least two customers, (ii) the expert has never charged pH in any of the previous
periods and (iii) the game is in period 1–7. Otherwise, each customer expects to
be charged pH . Each customer believes to be treated sufficiently if and only if (i)
the expert serves at least two customers, (ii) the expert has never undertreated in
any of the previous periods, and (iii) the game is in periods 1–9. Otherwise, each
customer expects to receive the minor treatment.
Customers’ strategy: Each customer visits the same expert as all other customers
(in the following expert A) in the first period. If expert A did not undertreat any
of the customers and did not charge pH in the previous period, customers return
to expert A. If expert A undertreated in the previous period or charged pH , all
customers visit expert B. If expert B did not undertreat any of the customers and
did not charge pH in the previous period, customers return to expert B; otherwise,
all customers visit expert C. If expert C did not undertreat any of the customers and
did not charge pH in the previous period, customers return to expert C; otherwise,
all customers visit expertD. If expertD did not undertreat any of the customers and
did not charge pH in the previous period, customers return to expert D; otherwise,
all customers visit expert A if expert A has not undertreated in any of previous
periods; otherwise, all customers visit expert B; and so forth. If there is no expert
who has not undertreated, customers do not interact. In periods 10–16, customers
choose expert A if he has not undertreated customers in periods 1–9 and has only
charged pL in periods 1–7. Otherwise, customers choose expert B if he has not
undertreated customers in periods 1–9 and has only charged pL in periods 1–7; and
so forth. If there is no expert who never undertreated, customers randomize between
experts with equal probability in periods 10–16.
Experts’ strategy: Each expert treats his customers sufficiently in periods 1–9
if he serves two or more customers and provides the minor treatment otherwise.
Experts always provide the minor treatment in periods 10–16. In periods 1–7, each
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expert charges each customer pL if he serves at least two customers and charges pH
otherwise. In periods 8–16, experts always charge pH .
Verification:
We now verify that the above described strategies and beliefs form a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. We first show that customers’ strategies are rational. Customers in-
teract in periods 1–8 because their expected payoff from interacting amounts to
10 − 4 = 6 which is more than the outside option of 1.6. Customers interact in
period 9 because 0.5(10− 8) + 0.5(10− 8) = 2 > 1.6. Customers interact in periods
10–16 because 0.5(10− 3) + 0.5(0− 3) = 2 > 1.6.
In the following, we show that experts’ strategy is rational. In periods 10–16 it
is optimal to always provide the minor treatment because the maximum additional
future payoff of treating sufficiently 6 · 2.4 = 14.4 (in period 10) is lower than the
maximum current payoff from deviating 4((8 − 2) − (8 − 6)) = 16. In period 9,
if the expert serves four customers, the expert’s maximum additional future payoff
of treating customers sufficiently amounts to 7 · 2.4 = 16.8 whereas the maximum
additional current payoff from deviating is 4((8 − 2) − (8 − 6)) = 16. If the expert
serves three customers, his maximum additional future payoff of treating customers
sufficiently also amounts to 7(4 − 1.6) = 16.8 (because the single customer will
visit this expert in periods 10–16) whereas the maximum additional current profit
from deviating is 3((8 − 2) − (8 − 6)) = 12. If an expert serves two customers in
period 9, the maximum current payoff from deviating amounts to 2((8 − 2) − (8 −
6)) = 8. Whether the expert will serve all four customers in periods 10–16 depends
on whether the expert serves the strict majority of customers in period 9. Given
customers’ strategies, an expert should never serve only two customers. Hence,
Bayes’ rule cannot be applied to calculate the probability with which an expert
expects to be the expert with the strict majority of customers. We assume that the
expert believes to serve the strict majority of customers with probability 1. Given
these beliefs, the expert’s maximum additional future payoff of treating sufficiently
amounts to 16.8 because all customers will choose this expert in periods 10–16. In
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periods 8 and 9, future payoff of treating customers sufficiently is larger so that
deviation incentives are lower. Hence, the expert will treat customers sufficiently if
he serves at least two customers under the above beliefs. In case the expert only
serves one customer, the maximum additional future payoff from treating sufficiently
amounts to 7(1− 1.6) = −2.8 while the maximum current payoff from deviating is
4.
Next, we consider check experts’ incentive to deviate from their strategy in periods
1–7. Note that experts’ incentive to deviate is largest in period 1 and not in pe-
riod 7. This is because experts make zero profits if they play according to equilibrium
strategy in periods 1–7 while a deviation leads to profits of 1.6 (outside option). In
period 1, experts’ behavior is rational because the maximum additional current pay-
off from deviating—if all four customers have a major problem, the expert charges
pH but provides the minor treatment—amounts to 4((8−2)−(4−6)) = 32 while the
maximum expected future payoff from charging pL and treating sufficiently amounts
to 2 · 4(0.5(8− 6) + 0.5(8− 2))− 9 · 1.6 + 7 · 2.4 = 34.4.55 For the case of three and
two customers, the same reasoning applies as for the deviation in period 9. Hence,
experts charge pL if they face at least two customers given the above outlined belief.
In periods 2–7, the incentive to deviate is lower than in period 1. Thus, the experts’
behavior is rational.
55In periods 1–9, the expert sticking to the equilibrium strategy gives up the outside option of
1.6. In periods 8 and 9, the expert can charge all four customers the major treatment although
in expectation only two customers need the major treatment. In periods 10–16, the expert’s
additional expected future profit amounts to 7(4− 1.6).
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4.9 Appendix B: Screenshots of Feedback Systems
4.9.1 Feedback System in a Fixed Price Market
Figure 4.4: Patient feedback at the Arztnavigator. Source: https://weisse-
liste.arzt-versichertenbefragung.tk.de/, accessed on July 18,
2012.
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4.9.2 Feedback System in a Flexible Price Market
Figure 4.5: Car repair shop rating at Google Maps.
Source: https://plus.google.com/109459300714062123468/
about?gl=US&hl=en, accessed on July 18, 2012.
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4.10 Appendix C: Instructions
In the following, we present the instructions for the public histories under flexible
prices treatment. The instructions are taken from Dulleck et al. (2011) and have
been adapted for our purposes.
 1 
ANLEITUNG ZUM EXPERIMENT 
Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme am Experiment. Bitte sprechen Sie bis zum Ende des Experiments 
nicht mehr mit anderen Teilnehmern. 
 
2 Rollen und 16 Runden 
Dieses Experiment besteht aus 16 Runden, die jeweils die gleiche Abfolge an Entscheidungen haben. Die 
Abfolge der Entscheidungen wird unten ausführlich erklärt. 
Es gibt im Experiment 2 Rollen: Spieler A und Spieler B. Zu Beginn des Experiments bekommen Sie 
eine dieser Rollen zufällig zugelost und behalten diese Rolle für das gesamte Experiment. Auf dem ersten 
Bildschirm des Experiments sehen Sie, welche Rolle Sie haben. Diese Rolle bleibt für alle Spielrunden 
gleich. 
In Ihrer Gruppe sind 4 Spieler A und 4 Spieler B. Die Spieler jeder Rolle bekommen eine Nummer. Sind 
Sie ein Spieler B, dann sind Ihre potentiellen Interaktionspartner die Spieler A1, A2, A3 und A4. Sind Sie 
hingegen ein Spieler A, dann sind Ihre potentiellen Interaktionspartner die Spieler B1, B2, B3 und B4.  
Die Nummern der Spieler sind fix. Das heißt, dass zum Beispiel hinter der Nummer „A1“ oder hinter der 
Nummer „B3“ immer dieselbe Person steht. Spieler A erfährt zu keinem Zeitpunkt, mit welchem/welchen 
Spieler/n B (B1-B4) er interagiert. 
 
Alle Experimentteilnehmer erhalten die gleichen Informationen bezüglich der Regeln des Spiels, 
inklusive der Kosten und Auszahlungen an beide Spieler. 
 
Überblick über die Entscheidungen in einer Runde 
Jede einzelne Runde besteht aus maximal 4 Entscheidungen, die hintereinander getroffen werden. Die 
Entscheidungen 1, 3 und 4 werden von Spieler A getroffen; die Entscheidung 2 wird von Spieler B 
getroffen. 
 
Ablauf der Entscheidungen einer Runde (kurz gefasst) 
1. Die Spieler A wählen Preise für die Aktionen 1 und 2. 
2. Jeder Spieler B erfährt die von den 4 Spielern A (A1 bis A4) gewählten Preise. Dann entscheidet 
Spieler B, ob er mit einem Spieler A interagieren möchte. Es ist nur möglich, mit einem Spieler A 
zu interagieren. Falls Spieler B mit keinem Spieler A interagiert, endet diese Runde für ihn. 
Falls Spieler B mit einem Spieler A interagiert ... 
3. Der jeweilige Spieler A erhält die Information, ob einer oder mehrere Spieler B mit ihm 
interagieren. Es können maximal alle 4 Spieler B mit einem bestimmten Spieler A interagieren. 
Spieler A erfährt dann, welche Eigenschaften die Spieler B haben, die mit ihm interagieren. Es 
gibt zwei mögliche Eigenschaften: Eigenschaft 1 oder Eigenschaft 2. Diese Eigenschaft muss 
nicht identisch sein für die betreffenden Spieler B. Spieler A muss für jeden Spieler B, mit dem er 
interagiert, eine Aktion wählen: entweder Aktion 1 oder Aktion 2. 
4. Spieler A verlangt von Spieler B den in Entscheidung 1 festgelegten Preis für eine der beiden 
Aktionen. Dabei muss der verlangte Preis nicht gleich dem Preis der in Entscheidung 3 gewählten 
Aktion sein, sondern es kann auch der Preis der anderen Aktion sein. Außerdem kann Spieler A 
von verschiedenen Spielern B unterschiedliche Preise verlangen. 
 
Detaillierte Darstellung der Entscheidungen und ihrer Konsequenzen hinsichtlich der 
Auszahlungen 
 
Entscheidung 1 
Jeder Spieler A hat in Entscheidung 3 für den Fall einer Interaktion zwischen zwei Aktionen zu wählen, 
einer Aktion 1 und einer Aktion 2. Jede gewählte Aktion verursacht Kosten, die folgendermaßen fixiert 
sind: 
Die Aktion 1 verursacht Kosten von 2 Punkten (= experimentelle Währungseinheit) für Spieler A. 
Die Aktion 2 verursacht Kosten von 6 Punkten für Spieler A. 
Für diese Aktionen kann Spieler A von jenen Spielern B, die mit ihm interagieren wollen, Preise 
verlangen. In Entscheidung 1 muss jeder Spieler A diese Preise für beide Aktionen festlegen. Nur 
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(strikt) positive Preise in vollen Punkten von 1 Punkt bis maximal 11 Punkte sind möglich. D.h. die 
zulässigen Preise sind 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 oder 11. 
Beachten Sie, dass der Preis für die Aktion 1 den Preis für die Aktion 2 nicht übersteigen darf. 
 
 
Entscheidung 2 
Spieler B erfährt die von allen 4 Spielern A in Entscheidung 1 gesetzten Preise. Dann entscheidet Spieler 
B, ob er mit einem der Spieler A interagieren möchte, und wenn ja, mit welchem. 
Falls ja, dann bedeutet das, dass der entsprechende Spieler A in den Entscheidungen 3 und 4 eine Aktion 
wählen und dafür einen Preis verlangen kann (siehe unten). Spieler B wird aber nicht beobachten können, 
welche Aktion Spieler A wählt. 
Falls nein, dann endet diese Runde für diesen Spieler B und er erhält als Auszahlung für diese Runde 
1,6 Punkte. 
Falls keiner der Spieler B mit einem bestimmten Spieler A interagieren möchte, erhält auch der 
betreffende Spieler A als Auszahlung für diese Runde 1,6 Punkte. 
 
 
 
Auf der Folgeseite sehen Sie einen exemplarischen Bildschirm für die Entscheidung 2. Wenn Sie eine 
Interaktion mit einem bestimmten A-Spieler wünschen, dann klicken Sie bitte in der entsprechenden 
Spalte auf „Ja“ und bestätigen die Eingabe mit „OK“ (Sie müssen bei den anderen 3 A-Spielern dann 
nicht auf „Nein“ klicken). Wenn Sie überhaupt keine Interaktion wollen, dann müssen Sie nicht 4 Mal auf 
„Nein“ klicken, sondern können einfach OK bestätigen. (siehe Bildschirmerklärung). 
In der unteren Hälfte des Bildschirms sehen Sie alle bisherigen Runden (aktuell ist Runde 3). Die Spalten 
bedeuten Folgendes: 
- Runde: In welcher Runde etwas passiert ist 
- Spieler: Um welchen Spieler B es sich handelt 
- Verbindung zu: Hier sehen Sie, mit welchem Spieler A der jeweilige Spieler B interagiert hat (z.B. 
B4 in Runde 2 mit A3; „-“ falls keine Interaktion stattgefunden hat). 
- Preis für Aktion 1: welchen Preis der jeweilige Spieler A für Aktion 1 festgesetzt hat (falls Sie 
eine Interaktion hatten; sonst steht „-“ wie z.B. bei B4 in Runde 1). 
- Preis für Aktion 2: welchen Preis der jeweilige Spieler A für Aktion 2 festgesetzt hat. 
- Gewählter Preis: „Preis Aktion 1“ bedeutet, dass der Preis für die Aktion 1 gewählt wurde (z.B. in 
Runde 1 von A1). „Preis Aktion 2“ bedeutet, dass der Preis für Aktion 2 gewählt wurde (z.B. in 
Runde 2 von A3). „-“ wird angezeigt bei keiner Interaktion. 
- Aktion Spieler A: „ausreichend“ oder „nicht ausreichend“ (falls Interaktion stattgefunden hat) 
bzw. „-“ (falls keine Interaktion stattgefunden hat – wie in Runde 2 bei Spieler B2). (zur Erklärung 
siehe unten) 
- Rundengewinn: Ihr Gewinn in Punkten in der betreffenden Runde. (zur Berechnung siehe unten) 
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Entscheidung 3 
Vor der Entscheidung 3 (falls Spieler B in Entscheidung 2 „Ja“ gewählt hat) wird dem Spieler B zufällig 
eine Eigenschaft zugelost. Spieler B kann 2 Eigenschaften haben: Eigenschaft 1 oder Eigenschaft 2. Die 
Eigenschaft wird jede Runde neu und auch für jeden Spieler B unabhängig zufällig bestimmt. Jeder 
Spieler B hat mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit von 50% die Eigenschaft 1 und mit einer Wahrscheinlichkeit 
von 50% die Eigenschaft 2. Stellen Sie sich in jeder Runde für jeden Spieler B einen Münzwurf vor. 
Wenn beispielsweise „Kopf“ kommt, dann hätte der entsprechende Spieler B die Eigenschaft 1, falls 
„Zahl“ kommt, hätte er die Eigenschaft 2. 
 
Jeder Spieler A erfährt vor seiner Entscheidung 3 die Eigenschaften aller jener Spieler B, die mit 
diesem Spieler A interagieren wollen. Dann wählt Spieler A eine Aktion für jeden Spieler B, entweder 
Aktion 1 oder Aktion 2. Dabei kann die Aktion bei mehreren Spieler B auch unterschiedlich sein. 
Eine Aktion ist unter folgenden Bedingungen für einen bestimmten Spieler B ausreichend: 
a) Spieler B hat die Eigenschaft 1 und Spieler A wählt entweder die Aktion 1 oder die Aktion 2. 
b) Spieler B hat die Eigenschaft 2 und Spieler A wählt die Aktion 2. 
Eine Aktion ist nicht ausreichend, wenn Spieler B die Eigenschaft 2 hat, aber Spieler A die Aktion 1 
wählt. 
 
Spieler B erhält 10 Punkte, wenn die von Spieler A gewählte Aktion ausreichend ist. Spieler B erhält 0 
Punkte, wenn die von Spieler A gewählte Aktion nicht ausreichend ist. In beiden Fällen ist noch der 
entsprechende Preis zu bezahlen (siehe unten bei „Auszahlungen“). 
 
Spieler B wird zu keiner Zeit auf dem Computerbildschirm darüber informiert, ob er/sie in einer Runde 
die Eigenschaft 1 oder die Eigenschaft 2 hatte bzw. welche Aktion Spieler A gewählt hat.  
 
Entscheidung 4 
Spieler A verlangt von jedem Spieler B, der mit ihm interagiert, den in Entscheidung 1 festgelegten Preis 
für eine der beiden Aktionen. Dabei muss der verlangte Preis nicht gleich dem Preis der in Entscheidung 
3 gewählten Aktion sein, sondern es kann auch der Preis der anderen Aktion sein. Auch kann Spieler A 
von unterschiedlichen Spielern B (wenn mehrere Spieler B mit ihm interagieren) unterschiedliche Preise 
verlangen. 
 
Hier können Sie in 
höchstens einer 
Spalte „Ja“ an-
klicken. Wenn Sie 
gar nichts 
anklicken und auf 
„OK“ klicken, dann 
haben Sie in 
dieser Runde 
keine Interaktion. 
Die erste 
Zahl steht 
immer für 
„Preis für 
Aktion 1“ und 
die zweite für 
„Preis für 
Aktion 2“. 
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Im Folgenden sehen Sie einen exemplarischen Bildschirm für die Entscheidungen 3 und 4. Jeder Spieler 
A erfährt für jeden der 4 zufällig gereihten Spieler B, ob der betreffende Spieler B mit ihm interagieren 
möchte oder nicht (erste Zeile). Falls „JA“, dann steht in der entsprechenden Spalte die Eigenschaft von 
Spieler B. Darunter sind zur Wiederholung die Preise angegeben, die Spieler A in Entscheidung 1 
festgesetzt hat. 
Die beiden letzten Zeilen sind dann für jene Spalten auszufüllen, in denen bei Interaktion „JA“ steht. In 
der vorletzten Zeile muss für jeden Spieler B eine Aktion gewählt werden (1 oder 2) und in der letzten 
Zeile muss angegeben werden, welchen Preis Spieler A verlangen möchte (1 steht für den Preis für die 
Aktion 1; 2 steht für den Preis für die Aktion 2). Auf dem Beispielsbildschirm wollte ein Spieler B mit 
dem betrachteten Spieler A interagieren und für diese Spalten muss Spieler A seine Entscheidungen 
eingeben (d.h. die „0“-en ersetzen).  
 
 
 
 
In der/den Spalten 
mit „JA“ müssen Sie 
die letzten beiden 
Zeilen ausfüllen. 
In der Zeile unter 
„JA“ sehen Sie die 
Eigenschaft des 
jeweiligen Spieler B. 
In Spalten mit 
„NEIN“ können 
Sie in den beiden 
letzten Zeilen 
nichts verändern. 
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Auszahlungen 
Keine Interaktion 
Wenn Spieler B in Entscheidung 2 mit keinem Spieler A interagiert (Entscheidung „Nein“ für alle 4 
Spieler A), dann erhält er in dieser Runde 1,6 Punkte. 
Wenn kein Spieler B mit einem bestimmten Spieler A interagiert, dann erhält dieser Spieler A in dieser 
Runde auch 1,6 Punkte. 
 
Ansonsten (Entscheidung „Ja“ von Spieler B) sind die Auszahlungen wie folgt: 
 
Interaktion 
Spieler A erhält für jeden Spieler B, der mit ihm interagiert, seinen in Entscheidung 4 gewählten Preis (in 
Punkten) abzüglich der Kosten (siehe Seite 1 unten) für die in Entscheidung 3 gewählte Aktion. D.h. die 
Auszahlung eines Spielers A setzt sich aus allen Interaktionen zusammen, die ein Spieler A in einer 
bestimmten Runde hat. 
 
Für Spieler B hängt die Auszahlung davon ab, ob die vom betreffenden Spieler A in Entscheidung 3 
gewählte Aktion ausreichend war. 
a) Die Aktion von Spieler A war ausreichend. Spieler B erhält 10 Punkte abzüglich des in 
Entscheidung 4 verlangten Preises. 
b) Die Aktion von Spieler A war nicht ausreichend. Spieler B muss den in Entscheidung 4 
verlangten Preis bezahlen. 
 
 
Zu Beginn des Experiments erhalten Sie eine Anfangsausstattung von 6 Punkten. Außerdem erhalten 
Sie durch das Beantworten der Kontrollfragen 2 Euro (entspricht 8 Punkten). Aus diesen 
Anfangsausstattungen können Sie auch mögliche Verluste in einzelnen Runden bezahlen. Verluste sind 
aber auch durch Gewinne aus anderen Runden ausgleichbar. Sollten Sie am Ende des Experiments in 
Summe einen Verlust gemacht haben, müssen Sie diesen Verlust an den Experimentleiter bezahlen. Mit 
Ihrer Teilnahme am Experiment erklären Sie sich mit dieser Bedingung einverstanden. Beachten Sie aber 
bitte, dass es in diesem Experiment immer eine Möglichkeit gibt, Verluste mit Sicherheit zu vermeiden. 
 
Für die Auszahlung werden die Anfangsausstattungen und die Gewinne aller Runden zusammengezählt 
und mit folgendem Umrechnungskurs am Ende des Experiments in bares Geld umgetauscht: 
1 Punkt = 25 Euro-Cent 
(d.h. 4 Punkte = 1 Euro). 
5 Concluding Remarks
This thesis analyzes the impact of expert and market characteristics on the expert’s
incentive to defraud his customer. In chapter 2, we make use of a field study in
order to investigate the drivers of the expert’s incentive to overcharge. Focusing on
corporate garages, we find that a high level of competition reduces the incentive to
overcharge. This might be due to fact that a high level of competition implies low
customer search costs for a second opinion. Thus, the probability of a customer
to search for a different expert when receiving the diagnosis of a major problem is
high. Experts in a critical financial situation overcharge more often than experts
in a solid financial situation and thereby gamble for resurrection. Also, experts
facing low reputational concerns overcharge more often than those with high repu-
tational concerns. The reason is that experts with low reputational concerns only
lose current but no future profit in case the customer visits a different expert af-
ter receiving a major diagnosis. Furthermore, the study shows that a high expert
competence comes along with a low incentive to overcharge. The study presented
in chapter two thereby delivers practical customer implications. Customers should
avoid garages that have a low reputational concern and those in a critical financial
situation. Instead, customers should search for garages in competitive environments.
If customers are able to get a hint of the car repair shop’s competence, they should
not only choose the better competence because they want their problems to be fixed
but also because those garages face a lower incentive to overcharge.
While the car inspection market is characterized by certain price ranges that the
garages have to meet, another promising avenue of field research is the analysis of
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price changes on the experts’ incentive to defraud. In the German health care mar-
ket, there have been two exogenous price shocks within the last fifteen years. The
first was a considerable decline in prices when introducing the budget for outpatient
treatments while prices remained constant for inpatient treatments. The second
change in prices was when Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) were introduced. In-
patient treatments are remunerated by a lump sum instead by a fee for service ever
since while outpatient remuneration did not change. It would be interesting to ex-
ploit these natural experiments in order to analyze how the price changes impacted
the physicians’ treatment, charging, and defrauding behavior.
Chapter 3 introduces a model where experts (physicians) and customers (patients)
both have other-regarding preferences. It is shown that the level of overcharging in
the market does not necessarily decrease but may even increase when patients’ trust
costs increase—depending on the market equilibrium. Thus, the implications of the
model are twofold: sensitizing patients for overcharging lowers the level of fraud if
the market currently experiences a low level of fraud but it increases fraud if the level
of fraud is already high. A more morally focused education of physicians—leading
to an increase in the physicians’ trust costs—will always decrease the number of
searches for a second opinion and therefore increase welfare. Whereas in the model
it is assumed that each physician is working self-employed and independently, there
has been an increasing trend towards physician networks. Previous literature has
mainly focused on competitive effects of such physician networks (see, e. g., Haas-
Wilson and Gaynor, 1998; Sacher and Silvia, 1998). It might be interesting to
study—theoretically and empirically—how physician networks impact physicians’
defrauding behavior. One could expect that overtreatment is much more present
within than outside a physician network as referrals within a network can easily be
rewarded by referring patients back.
Chapter 4 provides theoretical predictions and experimental evidence on the ques-
tion of how price competition and different reputation mechanisms impact the ex-
pert’s incentive to defraud. We show that the level of undertreatment and the level
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of overcharging are significantly lower under fixed than under flexible prices. This
is due to the fact that the price competition undermines the expert’s incentive to
build up a good reputation by not undertreating if prices are flexible. Experts who
undertreated in previous periods try to balance their bad reputation by offering
low prices. The lower prices in turn make it less attractive for the expert to treat
sufficiently and to charge honestly. Interestingly, we find indicative evidence that
under flexible prices, there is more expert fraud if customers’ treatment histories are
public compared to when customers’ histories are private. The reason is that price
competition is even more intense under public than under private histories. This
again reduces the expert’s incentive to treat his customers sufficiently and to charge
them honestly. Our results are particularly interesting as Dulleck et al. (2012) find
opposite effects when varying the price system in markets where reputation building
is not possible: in such a market, price setting is the only way for experts to signal
honest treatment. Dulleck et al. (2012) show that the level of undertreatment is
lower and efficiency is higher under flexible than under fixed prices. Combining the
results of the two studies delivers two important implications for regulators: Firstly,
more customer information does not necessarily lead to a lower level of fraud nor does
it necessarily lead to a higher efficiency. Secondly, whether flexible or fixed prices
induce a lower level of fraud crucially depends upon which reputation mechanism is
in place.
This thesis provides important insights into the impact of market and expert char-
acteristics on the expert’s incentive to defraud. A major assumption for the models
here and in all other contributions on credence goods is, however, that customers
know the costs of the treatments.56 Considering the fact that customers do not even
know which treatment they need, this assumption seems to be demanding. Yet, re-
laxing the cost assumption makes it impossible for customers to infer from experts’
mark-ups to experts’ incentive to overcharge and to overtreat. It remains to be
56To the best of my knowledge, the only exception is Hilger (2011).
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investigated how the characteristics of a credence goods market shape the expert’s
fraudulent behavior under such conditions.
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